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THE PEOPLE PARADOX
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
U.S. land-use regulators are increasingly embracing mixed-land-
use "urban" neighborhoods, rather than single-land-use "suburban"
ones, as a planning ideal. This shift away from traditional regulatory
practice reflects a growing endorsement of Jane Jacobs's influential
argument that mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods are safer and
more socially cohesive than single-land-use suburban ones. Propo-
nents of regulatory reforms encouraging greater mixing of residential
and commercial land uses, however, completely disregard a sizable
empirical literature suggesting that commercial land use generates, ra-
ther than suppress, crime and disorder, and that suburban communi-
ties have higher levels of social capital than urban communities. This
Article constructs a case for mixed-land-use planning that tackles the
uncomfortable reality that these studies present. That case is built up-
on an apparent paradox: in urban communities, people do not, ap-
parently, make us safer. But they do make us feel safer. This "People
Paradox" suggests that, despite an apparent tension between city
busyness and safety, land-use regulations that enable mixed-land-use
neighborhoods may advance several important urban development
goals. It also suggests an often-overlooked connection between land-
use and policing policies.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am indebted to Peg Brinig, John Nagle, Rick
Garnett, Rich Schragger, and Avishalom Tor for helpful comments and to Notre Dame Law School
research librarian Patti Ogden for research support. Peter Reed provided superb research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, U.S. land-use regulations increasingly
have come to embrace mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods-rather
than single-land-use suburban ones-as a planning ideal. The magnitude
of the shift away from traditional land-use planning practices is dramatic.
For well over a century, elite thinking in the United States has favored
single-land-use communities, especially exclusively single-family residen-
tial neighborhoods. And, for nearly as long, regulators have relied upon
zoning laws segregating "incompatible" commercial and residential land
uses from one another to impose order on our cities. Although it re-
mains the case that "suburban" (that is, single-land-use) development
continues to be the norm in the United States, the growing preference
for land-use diversity is reflected both in the increasingly widespread
adoption of new regulatory mechanisms enabling (or even requiring) the
development of mixed-land-use neighborhoods and in hundreds of urban
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development projects, including "infill" efforts in center cities and the
dramatic reinvention of the U.S. public housing stock.'
The endorsement of urbanism as a planning ideal flows in part from
local governments' recognition of, and efforts to capitalize upon, cultural
shifts that favor urbanism. Over the past two decades, many cities-
including some long written off as lost causes-began to regain popula-
tion and vitality.' A plausible case can be made that a growing pref-
erence for city life, especially for the informal social interactions enabled
by dense, mixed-land-use environments, fueled this apparent urban re-
bound.' Local government officials therefore reasonably seek to offer
more of the dense, mixed-land-use neighborhoods that would-be urban-
ites desire. Since U.S. land-use laws tend to encourage sprawling subur-
ban development and disfavor dense urban development, responding to
the demand for urban neighborhoods frequently requires regulatory re-
form.4
The shift away from single-land-use planning practices also reflects
the influence of the self-styled "new urbanists." The new urbanists are a
loosely affiliated group of architects and urban-planning professionals
who promote the development of-and the adoption of legal rules that
enable and promote the development of-mixed-land-use neighbor-
hoods.' Over the last few decades, the new urbanists have mounted a
remarkably successful public relations campaign against traditional zon-
ing practices and the suburban land-use patterns resulting from them.
They also have developed an alternative to zoning laws- a system of aes-
1. See generally NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND
THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 150-88 (2010) (discussing three cities' reordering redevelop-
ment efforts).
2. See Patrick A. Simmons & Robert E. Lang, The Urban Turnaround, in 1 REDEFINING
URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 51,51 (Bruce Katz & Robert E.
Lang eds., 2003) ("Many older industrial cities have rebounded considerably from the traumatic popu-
lation losses of the 1970s."); Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, Downtown Rebound, in 1
REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, supra, at 63, 65-72
(demonstrating that downtown areas of center cities experienced the greatest population growth in the
1990s, with some downtowns gaining population even where overall city populations declined).
3. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer
City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1286-93 (2006) (arguing that urban resurgence is attributable in part to in-
creasing demand for the consumption amenities and informal social interactions provided by cities).
4. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (2004).
Environmental concerns-including concerns about global warming and the impending depletion of
petroleum reserves-also led some to argue that sprawling, single-land-use suburban development
practices are unsustainable and to condemn the prevailing system of land-use regulation that encour-
ages them. See Christopher B. Leinberger, The Next Slum?, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2008, at 70.
5. See Charter of the New Urbanism, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM (2001), http://www.
cnu.org/sites/files/charter-english.pdf [hereinafter: Charter of the New Urbanism] (stating the princi-
ples of the new urbanism); What Is CNU?, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, http://www.cnu.
org/who-we are (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (stating the principles of the new urbanism); see also
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 149-54
(1999) (describing the principles of the new urbanism).
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thetic regulation that they call "form-based" or "transect" zoning6-that
growing numbers of cities have begun to adopt.7
The new urbanists' case against single-land-use development pat-
terns is part antisuburban polemic and part prourban philosophy. At
heart, the new urbanists claim that cities are good for us, and suburbs are
bad. Or, to put the claim into social science terminology, the new
urbanists claim that cities generate social capital, while suburbs inhibit it.'
This claim builds, in important ways, upon Jane Jacobs's enormously in-
fluential book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, which was
first published in 1961. 9 Jacobs wrote at the apex of the urban renewal
period-a time when urban planning ideology and practices strongly fa-
vored the imposition of single-land-use patterns on our cities, even to the
point of demolishing mixed-land-use communities in order to replace
them with single-land-use ones. She vehemently rejected .the accepted
wisdom that dense, mixed-use urban neighborhoods were hopelessly an-
tiquated and unhealthy.10 On the contrary, she argued that mixed-land-
use neighborhoods are critical to city life because commercial land uses
both generate social capital and guarantee a steady supply of "eyes upon
the street" to monitor and keep disorder and crime in check."
A significant difficulty with these claims is that they appear to be
wrong. The available empirical evidence, which is almost entirely ig-
nored, tends to rebut them. Researchers testing Jacobs's claims about
mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods have concluded that commercial
land uses generate, rather than suppress, crime and disorder. 2 Other re-
6. New urbanists argue that cities should regulate property based upon building form, not
building use. For example, architect Andr6s Duany's "SmartCode" proceeds upon the assumption
that development naturally progresses from urban (most intense) to rural (least intense). ANDRES
DUANY ET AL., SMARTCODE & MANUAL (2006), http://www.dpz.com/pdf/3000-SmartCode-v8.0%20
combined.pdf (including the complete SmartCode version 8.0). Duany calls this progression the "tran-
sect" and urges cities to replace use zoning with the regulation of building form appropriate to the var-
ious "transect zones" along the progression. Id. at C2; Andris Duany & Emily Talen, Transect Plan-
ning, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N, 245, 245-49 (2002). Theoretically, the concept is relatively simple: build-
ings appropriate for the city center should go in the city center (regardless of what they are used for),
and suburban buildings should look suburban (regardless of what they are used for). See, e.g., Chad
D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 MO. L. REV. 637,
638-45 (2006); Peter Katz, Form First, PLANNING, NoV. 2004, http://www.formbasedcodes.
org/files/FormFirst.pdf (describing the merits of form-based coding).
7. See infra note 35.
8. For a thoughtful discussion of the new urbanism and social capital, see Sheila R. Foster, The
City As an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527,559-61
(2006). Social capital is the subject of a voluminous, and somewhat contentious, literature. See, e.g.,
DAVID HALPERN, SOCIAL CAPITAL 1-45 (2005) (reviewing literature). For present purposes, Robert
Putnam's "lean and mean" formulation -"social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustwor-
thiness that arise from them" -suffices. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
9. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
10. Id. at 3-25.
11. Id. at 34-38.
12. See infra Part ll.B.
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searchers have studied, and rejected, the new urbanists' claim that cities
have higher levels of social capital than suburbs-finding, in contrast,
that suburban communities are more socially cohesive and their residents
more socially involved than urban communities and urbanites." In other
words, the available empirical evidence suggests that Jacobs's case for
mixed-land-use neighborhoods, echoed by the new urbanists, is theoreti-
cally appealing but empirically unsustainable. 4
Proponents of mixed-land-use planning practices (including, admit-
tedly, myself) have failed to come to terms with this literature." This Ar-
ticle represents an effort to fill that significant gap in the legal literature
on land-use planning-that is, to build a case for mixed-land-use plan-
ning that tackles the uncomfortable reality that these empirical studies
present. That case is built upon an apparent paradox. In urban commu-
nities, people do not appear to make us safer, but they do apparently
make us feel safer. In other words, busier neighborhoods, contra Jacobs,
are not necessarily safer neighborhoods. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that commercial land uses generate crime and disorder precisely
because they increase the number of people in public spaces. 6 Despite
this, other evidence suggests that people feel safer in busy places. 7 At
least in urban neighborhoods, that is, we are afraid of being alone." We
believe that there is safety in numbers. In other words, we associate
"aloneness" with vulnerability to crime. This dichotomy is particularly
paradoxical because commercial land uses generate both the busyness
and vitality that people intuitively associate with personal security and
13. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
14. There is substantial evidence that crime increases along with population densities, though
some scholars argue the relationship is more complicated than conventional wisdom would suggest. I
leave this literature to the side here, however, as I am primarily concerned with the claim that com-
mercial land uses will suppress crime. The two issues are related, however, since population densities
tend to be higher in communities characterized by a mix of commercial and residential land uses. See,
e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Structural Density and Criminal Victimization, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 276, 290
(1983) ("[T]he effect of density on crime is highly contingent on type of density, type of crime, areal
unit of analysis, and the extent of urbanization."); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Sys-
tematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105
AM. J. Soc. 603, 637-38 (1999) (questioning the relationship between disorder and serious crime).
15. A related difficulty with this claim is a separate literature linking population densities and
crime. I leave this literature to one side for present purposes. See, e.g., Ronald W. Beasley & George
Antunes, The Etiology of Urban Crime: An Ecological Analysis, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 439, 458-59 (1974)
(finding that lower median income and high population density were strongly correlated with high
crime rates); Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Why Is There More Crime in Cities?, 107 J. POL.
ECON. S225, S225-26 (1999) (finding a strong positive correlation between city size and crime rates per
capita); Keith Harries, Property Crimes and Violence in United States: An Analysis of the Influence of
Population Density, 1 INT'L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 24, 24, 31 (2006) (using crime data from Baltimore
County, Maryland, and finding "that both property and violent crimes were moderately correlated
with population density"); Sampson, supra note 14, at 288-91 (finding a positive relation between
structural density and robbery and assault rates, even after controlling for age, race, and sex).
16. Cf. Glaeser & Sacerdote, supra note 15, at S225-26.
17. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 9, at 34-37.
18. See infra text accompanying note 162.
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the crime and disorder that makes us fearful. In previous work, I have
argued that reducing the fear of crime-even when crime itself does not
decrease-is an important and frequently disregarded urban develop-
ment goal. 19 The "People Paradox" suggests that, despite an apparent
tension between city busyness and safety, land-use regulations that en-
able mixed-land-use neighborhoods may advance this goal, thereby in-
creasing the competitiveness of cities vis-a-vis their suburban neighbors.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II sets forth Jane Jacobs's
"order-maintenance" justification for mixed-land-use urban neighbor-
hoods, as well as outlines the more recent "new urbanist" attack on tradi-
tional zoning practices. Part III explores the empirical literature testing
and rejecting Jacobs's (and the new urbanists') assertion that mixed-
land-use neighborhoods are safer and more socially cohesive than single-
land-use ones. Part IV explicates the important distinction between
crime and the fear of crime, and it explores a number of factors that cause
people to be fearful-including being alone in public places. Finally,
Part V builds a case for mixed-land-use planning practices that takes into
account the People Paradox. Given the shifting preferences among some
Americans in favor of an "urban" lifestyle and the apparent instinctive
association between busyness and safety, I argue that the evidence con-
necting mixed-land-use neighborhoods with elevated levels of crime and
disorder complicates, but does not rebut, the case for land-use diversity
in our cities. It does, however, suggest a critical connection between ur-
ban planning policies and urban policing practices - a connection that
debates about both land-use planning and law enforcement frequently
overlook.
II. LAND-USE PATTERNS, DISORDER, AND CRIME
Over the past three decades, urban policy in the United States has
come to focus intensely on curbing disorder and cracking down on minor
"quality of life" offenses in public spaces. These policies trace their intel-
lectual roots to the 1982 publication of James Q. Wilson and George
Kelling's enormously influential essay, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety.20 In their essay, Wilson and Kelling first articulat-
ed the influential "broken windows hypothesis," which posits a causal
connection between disorder and crime.2 1 Wilson and Kelling reasoned
that unaddressed manifestations of disorder, even minor ones like bro-
ken windows, signal a breakdown in the social order that accelerates
19. See GARNETr, supra note 1, at 128-32.
20. James 0. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safe-
ty, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
21. Id. at 31.
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neighborhood decline and eventually generates serious crime.2 2 The
broken windows hypothesis has revolutionized policing practices in the
United States, prompting the implementation of myriad "order-
maintenance" and "community policing" policies that aim to suppress
disorder and restore the quality of life in our public urban spaces. These
policies have found champions in the legal academy among social norms
scholars who argue that disorder is a precursor to more serious deviancy
and crime, and, therefore, that order-maintenance policing strategies are
needed to keep disorder in check. 3 As Dan Kahan has observed,
"Cracking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang ac-
tivity and other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable on this ground,
since disorderly behavior and the law's response to it are cues about the
community's attitude toward more serious forms of criminal wrongdo-
ing. ' 24 Efforts to test this claim have generated a voluminous empirical
literature, and scholars are sharply divided over whether the available
evidence in fact supports the asserted crime-disorder nexus. 5
Despite the scholarly disagreement, the "order-maintenance revolu-
tion" is, at least at the retail-policy level, motivated by a desire to make
our cities safer. From their inception, order-maintenance reforms have
flowed from a conviction that the dominant post-war "law enforcement"
model of policing-which disregarded minor crime and disorder and fo-
cused on solving crimes rather than preventing them-was ineffective, if
not counterproductive.2 6 Moreover, a plausible case can be made that
22. See id. ("[Alt the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a
kind of developmental sequence." (alteration omitted)).
23. For comprehensive treatments of the "social influence" justification for order-maintenance
policing, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 367-73 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective
Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513,1527-38 (2002).
24. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 23, at 351.
25. Compare WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990) (finding a causal connection between disorder
and robbery rates), Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 235, 262 (2005) (finding a causal connection between the decline in rates of motor vehicle theft,
robberies, and grand larcenies in New York City and aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy), and
GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE MATTER?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT
OF NEW YORK CITY'S POLICE REFORMS 16-18 (Dec. 2001) (attributing the dramatic decline in crime
in New York City to an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy), with BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 123 (2001) (challenging
Skogan's findings), Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New
York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 275-76 (2006) (challenging the
finding that aggressive misdemeanor policies in New York City were causally connected to the decline
in certain crime rates) and Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 637-38 (finding disorder was
correlated with robbery but questioning whether a causal connection between disorder and serious
crime exists).
26. See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 85-89 (1996) (describing the col-
lapse of reform-era policing strategies by the 1970s); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Qual-
ity of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-
68 (1997) (reviewing the history of U.S. policing practices).
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the intense focus on curbing disorder and restoring norms of decorum in
urban communities were necessary prerequisites to the success of any
urban development effort. Prior to the publication of Broken Windows
and the adoption of the numerous "order-maintenance" policing policies
flowing from it, disorder, crime, and fear of crime often represented an
almost insurmountable impediment to urban development efforts. 27 As
Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb have argued, the dramatic reduc-
tion in center-city crime rates as well as the restoration of order in urban
public spaces has helped to fuel a shift in elite lifestyle preferences favor-
ing urban life.28 In addition to making life generally unpleasant, crime,
fear, and disorder prevent city dwellers from enjoying urban amenities
and decrease opportunities for the informal social interactions that cities
foster. Over the past three decades, Glaeser and Gottlieb argue, as crime
plummeted and urban officials began to focus on improving the quality
of life in public spaces, it became easier to enjoy urban life. 29
A. The Order-Maintenance Justification for Mixing Land Uses
During roughly the same time period, urban land-use policies also
have increasingly embraced a greater diversity of land uses than permit-
ted by traditional zoning laws. Urban officials' gradual endorsement of
mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods as a planning ideal clearly is a re-
sponse in part to the phenomenon identified by Glaeser and Gottlieb-
more Americans are embracing urban lifestyles. 0 But it also reflects the
growing influence of the self-styled "new urbanists." The new urbanists
champion "traditional neighborhood design" principles featuring "walk-
able" mixed-land-use neighborhoods-that is, neighborhoods where
homes are situated within walking distance of businesses, restaurants,
parks, and civic buildings." The new urbanists are best known for their
attempts to recreate traditional urban communities from scratch; as a re-
sult, new urbanists face accusations that they are nothing more than de-
velopers of wealthy suburban developments.3 2 The foundational plan-
ning principle of new urbanism, however, is an urban one-namely, that
relatively dense, mixed-land-use neighborhoods are both superior to
27. See, e.g., PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 152 (2000) ("Out-of-control crime was the nearly universal expectation for
the inner city. Any other positive trend there ... was sharply hemmed in by the prospect of continued
crime and, just as important, an all-but-unshakable fear of crime."). See also JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY:
A GLOBAL HISTORY 154-55 (2005) ("One critical element in the late-twentieth-century revival in
some American cities, most notably in New York, can be traced to a significant drop in crime. This
was accomplished by the adoption of new policing methods and a widespread determination to make
public safety the number one priority of government.").
28. See Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 1288-93.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1297.
31. See generally FRUG, supra note 5, at 149-54 (describing new urbanism).
32. ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 151-53 (2005).
[Vol. 2012
THE PEOPLE PARADOX
sprawling, single-land-use ones and more conducive to community life.33
Their arguments are increasingly influencing not just the design of sub-
urban developments but also the direction of urban development strate-
gies.34 The extent of the new urbanists' influence is reflected perhaps
most dramatically in the gradual adoption of their regulatory alternative
to traditional use-based zoning laws-a system of aesthetic controls that
new urbanists style "form-based" or "transect" zoning. 5
Although new urbanists do not share her more libertarian prefer-
ence for an organic urban order (rather than a planned one), the group
traces its intellectual roots to Jane Jacobs's influential and spirited de-
fense of urban life. In her classic book, The Death and Life of Great
American Cities,36 Jacobs offered two related reasons for favoring mixed-
land-use urban neighborhoods. First, she argued that mixed-land-use
neighborhoods are safer than single-land-use ones.37 She intuited that by
drawing people into city streets, businesses generate "eyes up on the
street" that keep disorder and crime in check.' Thus, Jacobs predicted
that "[a] well-used city street is apt to be a safe street. A deserted city
street is apt to be unsafe."39 Indeed, she went so far as to argue that
neighborhood bars could contribute to neighborhood security, reasoning
that their patrons would serve a private surveillance function well into
the night hours.40 In making this argument, she drew upon her own
neighborhood's anecdotal experience with a bar called the White Horse
Tavern, which, because it was once frequented by the poet Dylan Thom-
as, served as the locus of a nightly "college bull session with beer, com-
bined with a literary cocktail party."'" Jacobs observed that, "We are for-
tunate enough, on the street, to be gifted... with a famous bar that
33. See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 5, at 151-52 (summarizing the principles of new urbanism); Char-
ter of the New Urbanism, supra note 5 ("[N]eighborhoods should be diverse in use and popula-
tion ...").
34. See GARNETT, supra note 1, at 65,150-88.
35. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, ALA., SMARTCODE art. 2, § 2, tbl.1 (2007), available at http:lwww.
montgomeryal.gov/index.aspx?page=717 (follow SmartCode Manual hyperlink); MIAMI, FLA., 21
CODE art. 5, § 3, illus. 5.3 (2011), http://www.miami2l.org/PDFs/May2Oll/Article5-SpecifictoZones-
May2011.pdf; PASS CHRISTIAN, MISS., SMARTCODE § art. 3, § 2, tbl.1 (2009), http://www.ci.pass-
christian.ms.us/Smartcode.pdf; ONONDAGA COUNTY, N.Y., 9921 ONONDAGA CODE § 1.5 (2001),
http://www.ongov.net/planning/documents/plan.settlement TND-code.pdf; Petaluma, Cal., Ordi-
nance 2152 N.C.S., app. A (June 16, 2003), http://cityofpetaluma.net/cdd/pdf/cpsp/CentralPetaluma
SpecificPlan.pdf.
36. In contrast to the new urbanists, Jacobs took care to limit her arguments to cities, warning:
But I hope no reader will try to transfer my observations into guides as to what goes on in towns,
or little cities, or in suburbs which still are suburban.... We are in enough trouble already from
trying to understand big cities in terms of the behavior, and the imagined behavior, of towns. To
try to understand towns in terms of big cities will only compound confusion.
JACOBS, supra note 9, at 16.
37. Id. at 36-37.
38. Id. at 35.
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id. at 40-41.
41. Id. at 40.
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draws continuous troops of strangers .... The comings and goings from
this bar do much to keep our street reasonably safe and populated until
three in the morning, and it is a street always safe to come home to."42
Second, Jacobs argued that commercial land uses, especially small
businesses like restaurants, bars, and stores, help build community by
drawing together people who would not otherwise meet. Jacobs rea-
soned, "The trust of a city street is formed over time from many, many,
little public sidewalk contacts. It grows out of people stopping by at the
bar for a beer, getting advice from the grocer and giving advice to the
newsstand man. . . .-41 The new urbanists emphasize this aspect of Ja-
cobs's work in particular, arguing that the single-land-use design of sub-
urbia contributes to the privatization and atomization of our society and
deprives many Americans of the opportunity to interact with, and come
to understand, individuals from different races and classes.' New
urbanist Philip Langdon, for example, echoes Jacobs when he argues,
"[T]he tavern, the cafe, the coffee shop, the neighborhood store ... have
been zoned out of residential areas.... As informal gathering places
have been banished, many opportunities for making friendships and pur-
suing common interests have disappeared. '45 The new urbanists also join
political scientist Robert Putnam in claiming that postwar suburbaniza-
tion itself (and not just the design of suburban communities) contributed
to a decline in social capital in the United States because long commutes
now consume time that Americans might otherwise use to socialize or
participate in community-building activities.46
As a practical matter, the social-capital and order-maintenance jus-
tifications for mixed-land-use planning are closely linked. Both common
sense and social-science data suggest that social capital suppresses crime
and disorder. For example, numerous studies link collective efficacy,
which sociologists and social psychologists define as the "ability of
neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents and maintain ef-
fective social controls, ' 47 with neighborhood health. Collective efficacy is
42. Id. at 40-41.
43. Id. at 56. See also ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 59-64 (2000) ("Americans are splintering into insular fac-
tions, each pursuing an increasingly narrow agenda, with nary a thought for the greater good. Fur-
ther, more and more citizens seem to be withdrawing from public life into the shelter of their private
homes .... [Ilt is near-impossible to imagine community independent of the town square or the local
pub .... [P]edestrian life cannot exist in the absence of worthwhile destinations that are easily accessi-
ble on foot. This is a condition that modern suburbia fails to satisfy, since it strives to keep all com-
mercial activity well separated from housing.").
44. See, e.g., DUANY ET AL., supra note 43, at 59-64; FRUG, supra note 5, at 149-51.
45. PHILIP LANGDON, A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE: RESHAPING THE AMERICAN SUBURB 15-16
(1994).
46. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 205-15.
47. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1604 (2002). For
a fuller discussion on collective efficacy and neighborhood health, see Robert J. Sampson et al.,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
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perhaps best understood as a form of applied social capital -it is a means
by which communities harness the energy generated by "social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them"'
for the purpose of addressing neighborhood problems. Not surprisingly,
neighborhoods with high levels of collective efficacy are healthier than
those with lower levels. Neighborhoods with low levels of collective effi-
cacy exhibit more signs of social distress-for example, they are more
dangerous and disorderly and residents are more fearful of victimiza-
tion-than those with higher levels. 9
B. The Empirical (Counter) Evidence
The popular and academic commentary on Jacobs's arguments al-
most entirely neglect to take into account the empirical literature testing
her hypothesis that commercial land uses foster social capital and sup-
press crime. The relative neglect of this work in the land-use literature is
unfortunate. Most of the researchers conducting these studies reject Ja-
cobs's hypothesis as intuitively appealing but empirically unsustainable.
They find instead that commercial land uses increase crime and disorder
and suppress social capital. 0
1. Land Uses and Crime
In a number of studies, criminologists, sociologists, and environ-
mental psychologists have examined the connection between land-use
patterns and disorder, crime, and social capital. These studies test Ja-
cobs's claims that, by comparing the levels of crime, disorder, and social
cohesion in exclusively residential and mixed-land-use neighborhoods.
Some of these studies focus on so-called land-use "hot spots"-that is,
particular land uses associated with high levels of crime and disorder and
low levels of collective efficacy.' The link between commercial land us-
48. PUTNAM,supra note 8, at 19.
49. See, e.g., Chris L. Gibson et al., Social Integration, Individual Perceptions of Collective Effica-
cy, and Fear of Crime in Three Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537, 540-43 (2002) (collecting literature); Matthew
R. Lee & Terri L. Earnest, Perceived Community Cohesion and Perceived Risk of Victimization: A
Cross-National Analysis, 20 JUST. Q. 131, 138-39 (2003); Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places and Broken
Windows?: Toward Defining the Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models,
45 Soc. Q. 185,186-88 (2004).
50. See, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 624 ("Neighborhoods with mixed resi-
dential and commercial development exhibit higher levels of both physical and social disorder, regard-
less of sociodemographic characteristics.").
51. It is fair to say that the empirical literature on land-use hot spots does not bear out Jacobs's
hunch about taverns, as there is ample evidence that bars increase crime and disorder and suppress
informal social controls within a neighborhood. See, e.g., Dennis W. Roncek & Pamela A. Maier,
Bars, Blocks and Crimes Revisited: Linking the Theory of Routine Activities to the Empiricism of "Hot
Spots," 29 CRIMINOLOGY 725 (1991); Dennis W. Roncek & Mitchell A. Pravatiner, Additional Evi-
dence That Taverns Enhance Nearby Crime, 73 Soc. & Soc. RES. 185 (1989). Other "hot spots" studies
have found similar effects for a variety of nonresidential land uses, including public schools. See, e.g.,
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es, crime, and disorder is not, however, explained solely by hot spots. A
common method for testing the effects of commercial land uses on
neighborhood stability is the comparison of neighborhood pairs.12  Re-
searchers compare the crime rates (and, in some studies, levels of disor-
der) in two neighborhoods with similar demographic profiles but differ-
ent land-use patterns. These studies generally find that exclusively
residential neighborhoods have lower crime rates, less disorder, and
more collective efficacy than mixed residential and commercial neigh-
borhoods.3 For example, a study of one hundred neighborhoods in Seat-
tle, Washington found that the introduction of a single commercial en-
terprise was correlated with a thirty-one percent increase in crime."
Researchers conducting these studies link their findings to the "rou-
tine-activities" theory of crime. Routine-activities theory builds on the
insight that most predatory crime is opportunistic. As Robert Sampson
and Stephen Raudenbush summarize, "[P]redatory crime involves the
intersection in time and space of motivated offenders, suitable targets,
and the absence of capable guardians."55 Land-use patterns are relevant
to this thesis for two reasons. First, nonresidential land uses (for exam-
ple, schools, stores, parks, etc.) may serve to invite would-be offenders
into a neighborhood. By providing places for neighbors to congregate,
commercial land uses generate a larger pool of potential victims than res-
idential ones. In other words, while Jacobs may have been right that
commercial land uses increase the number of individuals present in an
urban neighborhood, the routine-activities theory suggests that higher
numbers of "eyes upon the street" may increase the number of potential
Dennis W. Roncek & Donald Faggiani, High Schools and Crime: A Replication, 26 SOC. Q. 491 (1985);
Dennis W. Roncek & Antoinette LoBosco, The Effect of High Schools on Crime in Their Neighbor-
hoods, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 598 (1983); Caterina Gouvis Roman, Schools As Generators of Crime: Routine
Activities and the Sociology of Place (Dec. 6, 2002) (unpublished PhD final report, American Univer-
sity; unpublished grant final report, U.S. Department of Justice), httpl/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijl
grants/201946.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: A Comparison of
Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods, 5
POPULATION & ENV'T 141 (1982).
53. See, e.g., id.; Ralph B. Taylor et al., Street Blocks with More Nonresidential Land Uses Have
More Physical Deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 120
(1995).
54. See Wilcox et al., supra note 49, at 191, 198. A more recent study of Columbus, Ohio found
that increasing densities of commercial and residential densities (measured by multifamily housing)
were consistently correlated with increased robbery rates, and that robbery rates continue to increase
along with densities. The researchers, however, suggested that densities of these land uses may have a
curvilinear effect on rates of homicide and aggravated assault-that is, the homicide and assault rates
increase with the introduction of additional commercial land uses and multifamily housing, but only to
a point, after which densities were linked to declining rates of homicide and aggravated assault. The
researchers, however, did not attempt to disaggregate the effects of these two types of land uses.
Christopher R. Browning et al., Commercial Density, Residential Concentration, and Crime: Land Use
Patterns and Violence in Neighborhood Context, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 329,345-50 (2010).
55. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 610.
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offenders, as well as the number of law-abiding crime monitors.16 Sec-
ond, contrary to Jacobs's intuition, commercial land uses may decrease
incentives for private surveillance efforts. Jacobs argued that outsiders
as well as insiders to a community provide "eyes upon the street" needed
to suppress disorder and crime. In Jacobs's view, both strangers and
neighbors can serve this critical informal-surveillance function. 8 Unfor-
tunately, the empirical evidence suggests that the opposite is true.
Strangers "invited" to a community by commercial land uses apparently
act to decrease, rather than increase, the level of informal surveillance in
a neighborhood. 9 They also appear to reduce neighborhood social cohe-
sion.60
Oscar Newman's important work on "defensible space" suggests
one possible explanation. According to Newman, architectural and ur-
ban design can decrease crime by increasing opportunities for residents
to exercise "ownership" over public spaces.6' We naturally have the
greatest desire to control our home environment.62 Resident surveys
conducted for the land-use studies discussed above suggest that commer-
cial land uses reduce informal monitoring because they reduce the sense
in which residents consider it their "own, '63 perhaps because commercial
land uses generate foot traffic that makes it difficult for residents to dis-
cern between insiders and outsiders in a community.6 In one study, for
example, "[r]esidents on blocks with more nonresidential land
use.., recognized other on-block residents less well, felt that they had
less control over events in the neighborhood, and were less likely to
count on a neighbor to watch out for suspicious activity" than residents
of exclusively residential blocks.65 The researchers conducting the studies
56. See Greenberg et al., supra note 52, at 162; Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 610;
Taylor et al., supra note 53, at 121; Wilcox et al., supra note 49, at 188-90, 200-02; see also Robert D.
Putnam, E Pluribus Unun: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN
POL. STUD. 137, 144-50 (2007).
57. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 35.
58. Id. at 40.
59. See supra note 56.
60. See supra note 56.
61. See GARNETT, supra note 1, at 67; see also OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME
PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN 2-3 (1972); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture As Crime Con-
trol, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (applying Newman's theory that architecture, urban design, and own-
ership can decrease crime).
62. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 79-80
(1998) (explaining the distinction between urban blocks and neighborhoods).
63. See supra notes 55-61.
64. That said, some nonresidential land uses may promote communal ownership of public space
by drawing neighbors together for a common endeavor. For example, Sheila Foster has argued that
community gardens can serve this function. See Foster, supra note 8, at 572-74.
65. See Ellen M. Kurtz et al., Land Use, Physical Deterioration, Resident-Based Control, and
Calls for Service on Urban Streetblocks, 15 JUST. 0. 121, 135 (1998) ("As nonresidential land use in-
creases, residents' perception of control decreases ...."); see also GARNETT7, supra note 1, at 67.
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thus concluded that commercial land uses create "holes in the fabric of
resident-based territorial control."' 6
All of these studies cast serious doubt on Jacobs's (and the new
urbanists') core claims about the benefits of mixed-land-use neighbor-
hoods. Commercial land uses appear to generate, rather than suppress,
crime and disorder. And, at least insofar as neighborhood-level social
capital is reflected in resident surveys about neighborhood social cohe-
sion and trust,67 they also appear to suppress, rather than generate, social
capital.
2. Suburbs, Cities, and Social Capital
Abstracting from the neighborhood context, the available data also
tends to rebut the new urbanists' broader claim that suburbanization is
causally linked to reduced levels of social capital in the United States. In
fact, there is evidence suggesting that social capital is lower in cities than
in suburbs. For example, as discussed above, Edward Glaeser and Josh-
ua Gottleib have suggested that the apparent resurgence in some denser
U.S. cities is partially attributable to a growing demand for city life.68
This demand, Glaeser and Gottlieb argued, has been fueled by the fact
that cities have certain social advantages over suburbs -particularly "the
reduced cost of face-to-face contact with other human beings" and higher
densities of "forms of consumption such as museums, restaurants, bars,
movie theatres and concert halls."69 Glaeser and Gottlieb further ob-
served that "The social advantages of big cities.., might lead some peo-
ple to think that cities have a real advantage in the formation of social
capital-i.e., social groups and networks."70 Glaeser and Gottlieb, in fact,
found that urban residents' consumption patterns suggest a greater level
of informal social interaction with strangers-that is, urbanites are more
likely to go out to eat, to the movies, or to an art gallery.71 Center-city
residents are less likely to engage in activities that are indicative of civic
engagement-for example, attending a church or club meeting, working
on a community project, writing a letter to a magazine or newspaper,
contacting a public official, or being a registered voter.72 While suburban
66. RALPH B. TAYLOR, HUMAN TERRITORIAL FUNCTIONING: AN EMPIRICAL, EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE ON INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP TERRITORIAL COGNITIONS, BEHAVIORS, AND
CONSEQUENCES 185 (1988).
67. Social scientists are divided about how to measure social capital. Common measures include
the various measures of the level of trust and/or the strength of social networks (roughly captured in
social cohesion surveys) and the level of voluntary participation (which might correlate with levels of
social cohesion but would not be captured by it). See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 8, at 31-37.
68. See supra Part II.A.
69. Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 1290.
70. Id. at 1293-94.
71. Id. at 1290-93.
72. Id. at 1294-95.
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residence also has negative effects, these effects are smaller than the ef-
fects of urban residence.73 Levels of participation in social activities-
such as volunteering, working on a community project, or attending a
club meeting-decline as urban densities rise.74  Glaeser and Gottlieb
concluded, "[D]enser places appear to have less, rather than more, social
capital.""
It is possible that the social capital generated by the informal social
interactions fueled by city life simply is not reflected in resident surveys
about community cohesion or civic involvement. For example, Putnam
distinguishes between two kinds of social capital-"bridging" and "bond-
ing."76 According to Putnam's formulation, "bonding" social capital is
"inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homo-
genous groups," such as ethnic fraternal organizations and church-based
reading groups.77 "Bridging" social capital is "outward looking and en-
compass[es] people across diverse social cleavages."78 Here, Putnam of-
fers the example of the civil rights movement.79 To be fair to their argu-
ments, it is clear that neither Jacobs nor the new urbanists claim that
commercial land uses generate "bonding" social capital. The interactions
that Jacobs and the new urbanists associate with land-use diversity are
primarily informal and inclusive, not deep and exclusive. In fact, Jacobs
argues that commercial land uses are important precisely because "[t]hey
bring together people who do not know each other in an intimate, pri-
vate social fashion and in most cases do not care to know each other in
that fashion."8
In other words, the fact that we do not get to know our barista well
does not mean that our encounters with her at Starbucks lack social val-
ue. Shallow interactions undoubtedly are important to the smooth func-
tioning of a diverse urban culture-as important or perhaps moreso than
deep ones. Consider, for example, the commonplace view that interact-
ing with strangers, especially individuals from different races and classes,
fosters understanding and respect for diversity (a view that social scien-
tists refer to as the "contact hypothesis")." Some scholars see urban
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1295. Glaeser and Gottlieb hypothesized that residents of less-dense places may have
more time to devote to community building activities because, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
commuting times increase with urban densities-hence, city dwellers have fewer hours for social and
civic engagement. Id. at 1296.
75. Id. at 1295.
76. PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 22.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 55-56 (emphasis added); see also DUANY ET AL., supra note 43, at
59--64.
81. The "contact hypothesis" is often attributed to Gordon W. Allport, whose 1954 work exam-
ined a variety of studies on racial attitudes during World War II and concluded that "evidence favors
the conclusion that knowledge about and acquaintance with members of minority groups make for
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neighborhoods as a mechanism for promoting these needed contacts.
For example, Jerry Frug has argued that urban life should increase race-
and class-tolerance by exposing residents to people who they would not
encounter in low-density, single-land-use suburbs.82 And sociologist
Thomas Wilson has asserted that "urbanism per se increases tolerance. "3
The problem with suburbia, according to contact theorists, is a lack of so-
cial inclusion, not necessarily a lack of social cohesion.' If the contact
hypothesis is correct, land-use policy can play a role in promoting inclu-
sion-and therefore understanding-by helping to draw people from dif-
ferent races and classes together. For example, by enacting a mixed-
land-use zoning designation for an urban neighborhood, regulators
would clear the legal way for shops, restaurants, and bars that might
serve this social-mixing function. Similarly, regulators could help ensure
greater class and race mixing by permitting apartments above stores or
authorizing-or, in some cases requiring-the construction of new multi-
family or moderate-priced housing."
Unfortunately, at least with respect to racial diversity, there is evi-
dence that living in proximity to "others" neither fosters tolerance for di-
versity nor builds social capital. For example, if residential integration
fostered racial understanding, it would be reasonable to expect that, all
things being equal, integrated neighborhoods would be relatively stable
ones-that is, characterized by low levels of residential turnover. But,
for reasons best explored in Thomas Schelling's seminal work on the ra-
cial "tipping point," racially integrated neighborhoods tend to be less
stable than single-race neighborhoods.86 And, while Schelling first articu-
lated his "tipping point" theory in the early 1970s-a time of dramatic
racial transition in urban neighborhoods-more recent data suggests that
his conclusions have staying power. Racially diverse neighborhoods are
both more common and more stable today than they were in the past.
That is, more neighborhoods are integrated, and remain integrated (rath-
er than transitioning to single-race neighborhoods), than in the past. Un-
tolerant and friendly attitudes." GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 267 (25th anni-
versary ed. 1979).
82. See FRUG, supra note 5, at 162-64.
83. Thomas C. Wilson, Urbanism and Tolerance: A Test of Some Hypotheses Drawn from Wirth
and Stouffer, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 117,121 (1985).
84. See FRUG, supra note 5, at 143-45; see also Susan S. Fainstein, Cities and Diversity: Should
We Want It? Can We Plan for It?, 41 URB. AFF. REV. 3 (2005).
85. See FRUG, supra note 5 at 151-53; see also Louis Wirth, Urbanism As a Way of Life, 44 AM.
J. SOC. 1, 15 (1938) ("The juxtaposition of divergent personalities and modes of life tends to produce a
relativistic perspective and a sense of toleration of differences .... ").
86. Schelling famously demonstrated that even a modest preference of white residents to live
next to other white residents could result in nearly complete residential segregation. See Thomas C.
Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143 (1971); see also THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).
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fortunately, however, racially diverse neighborhoods remain less stable
on average than racially segregated ones8
More recently, Putnam himself has suggested that increasing levels
of ethnic diversity in a community tends-at least in the short run-to
reduce social capital. Drawing upon the nationwide 2000 Social Capital
Community Benchmark Survey, which included approximately 30,000
Americans from dramatically different (in terms of racial diversity) U.S.
communities, Putnam concludes that social capital decreases as racial
and ethnic diversity increases." Putnam's findings are particularly rele-
vant to debates about land-use planning because they apply at both the
metropolitan level and the neighborhood level. Since the data from the
survey was geo-coded, Putnam knew the precise racial makeup of a re-
spondents' neighborhood and could therefore measure the effects of
neighborhood-level diversity on neighborhood-level social capital. 9 Put-
nam found that levels of trust between neighbors were inversely corre-
lated with diversity levels." That is, trust of neighbors decreases as
neighborhood diversity increases. He further found that results held true
for both inter-racial trust (that is, levels of trust in neighbors of a different
race) and intra-racial trust (that is, levels of trust in neighbors of the same
race).9 According to Putnam, racial diversity also appears to suppress
levels of confidence in local officials, of voter registration, of expecta-
tions of cooperation from other community members, of community in-
volvement, of charitable donations, and of volunteering.92 Residents of
more diverse communities even reported having fewer close friends and
feeling less happy than those living in homogenous ones. 93
Putnam stressed that his findings tend to rebut not just the "contact
hypothesis," which posits that ethnic diversity fosters interracial under-
standing, but also the "conflict hypothesis," which posits the opposite-
that ethnic diversity fosters interracial conflict.' Instead, Putnam con-
87. INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA'S NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS FOR
STABLE RACIAL INTEGRATION 24-25 (2000).
88. Putnam, supra note 56, at 138, 144, 149.
89. Id. at 144-45.
90. Id. at 147-48.
91. Id. at 146-48.
92. Id. at 149-50.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 141-42, 150-53. The conflict hypothesis usually is attributed to Herbert Blumer, who
argued "that race prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than in a set of feelings
which members of one racial group have toward the members of another racial group." Herbert
Blumer, Race Prejudice As a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. Soc. REV. 3, 3-6 (1958). Blumer hy-
pothesized that increased diversity challenges the dominant group's "sense of social position" and thus
creates conflict. Id. at 4 ("The dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such
but it is deeply concerned with its position vis-d-vis the subordinate group. This is epitomized in the
key and universal expression that a given race is all right in 'its place."'). See also LAWRENCE D.
BOBO & MIA TUAN, PREJUDICE IN POLITICS: GROUP POSITION, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE
WISCONSIN TREATY RIGHTS DISPUTE 13-14, 17 (2006) (arguing for a more developed version of
Blumer's "group position" thesis, using a conflict over Native American treaty rights); Marylee C.
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cluded, "Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but
anomie or social isolation. In colloquial language, people living in ethni-
cally diverse settings appear to 'hunker down'-that is, to pull in like a
turtle."95 Putnam took care to qualify these effects as "short to medium
run" and emphasized that the "medium to long run" benefits of racial di-
versity-including higher levels of creativity, innovation, and economic
growth-are substantial. 6 Moreover, Putnam's findings address only the
effects of racial diversity and immigration, not class diversity, which Frug
and others argue ought to be fostered and promoted by urban life. 7 Still,
it is fair to say that Putnam's sobering conclusions, as well as Glaeser and
Gottlieb's, pose a particular challenge for those who promote mixed-
land-use planning and urbanism as antidotes to social isolation and
pathways to racial and class understanding.
III. THE FEAR FACTOR
Although these studies suggested that the case for urbanism should
not continue to rest on the well-rehearsed claims that commercial land
uses suppress crime and promote social capital, they do not, in my view,
defeat the case for mixing land uses. Mixing land uses may generate
other benefits-benefits sufficient to overcome the negative externalities
of commercial land uses. One of these benefits is suggested by the Peo-
ple Paradox: busy places feel safer, even if they are not. And, for the rea-
sons set forth below, reducing the fear of crime is an important urban-
development goal-and one that is distinct from the reduction of crime
itself.98
A. Crime Versus Fear of Crime
Both the literature testing Jane Jacobs's assertion that mixed-land-
use neighborhoods are safer than single-land-use ones and the literature
testing the broken windows hypothesis's focus on the connections, if any,
between different policing and land-use policies and levels of serious
crime.99 The focus-by both researchers and urban policy makers-on
Taylor, How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count,
63 AM. Soc. REv. 512, 512 (1998) ("[W]hite negativity swells as the local black population share ex-
pands.").
95. Putnam, supra note 56, at 149.
96. See id. at 138-41.
97. See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 5, at 3-13.
98. See infra Part IV.A.
99. In the broken windows context, a second, equally intense, debate focuses on the question of
whether order-maintenance policies threaten to undermine civil liberties by reintroducing excessive
police discretion into policing practices. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Bro-
ken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); Ber-
nard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deter-
rence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L.
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serious crime is an entirely reasonable one. After all, there is no ques-
tion that serious crime is a serious matter, and a desire to decrease it mo-
tivates the widespread adoption of order-maintenance policing tactics.
That said, the literature measuring the connections between policing and
land-use policies and crime almost completely neglects a distinct measure
of safety -the fear of crime. There are, of course, practical reasons why
this is so. To begin, in the Broken Windows essay, Wilson and Kelling
asserted a very concrete, testable claim: Disorder causes crime."O Schol-
ars have reasonably sought to test this claim in order to make judgments
about the wisdom and efficacy of the policing policies that flow from it.I01
Moreover, and importantly, fear of crime is far more difficult to measure
than crime itself. Criminal statistics are hardly infallible. Indeed, since
they depend on a combination of police effort and citizen diligence in re-
porting crime, both of which vary by circumstance and are vulnerable to
error and manipulation, there is reason to think that crime statistics do
not accurately reflect levels of crime."2
Still, crime statistics exist. There are no official "fear" statistics.
Any effort to gauge the level of fear necessarily depends upon self-
reporting, usually in surveys, and social scientists remain divided about
how to construct survey instruments that capture "fear." Traditionally,
researchers have divided over whether to gauge fear levels by asking
people how concerned they are about crime, about the perceived risk of
victimization, or about precautions taken to avoid crime. Not surprising-
ly, survey results vary dramatically depending on the questions used to
measure fear."'
REV. 291 (1998); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
100. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 20, at 31-32.
101. See, e.g., Fagan & Davies, supra note 99; Harcourt, supra note 99.
102. To begin, not all crime is reported, so crime statistics systematically underestimate the extent
of the actual crime problem. Surveys can partially remedy this problem by asking residents to report
whether they were themselves victims of crime or know of friends and neighbors who have been vic-
timized. Survey data may be particularly helpful in gauging the extent of underpoliced criminal activi-
ty, including classic "social disorder" crimes such as gangs, drug dealing, and prostitution. While offi-
cial crime statistics generally measure the number of arrests, for these crimes, arrests reflect the level
of police effort rather than the extent of the actual problem. Unfortunately, however, surveys likely
overcompensate for the underreporting problem. Respondents may tend to overstate the prevalence
of crime, especially because informal and media reports of crime tend to have an amplification effect.
BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS
44-45 (1999); Barrett A. Lee, The Urban Unease Revisited: Perceptions of Local Safety and Neighbor-
hood Satisfaction Among Metropolitan Residents, 62 Soc. SC. Q. 611, 611-12 (1981); Terance D.
Miethe, Fear and Withdrawal from Urban Life, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 17
(1995). And there is always a risk that police officers will manipulate crime statistics to inflate evi-
dence of their success. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Da-
ta, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at 1 (describing a survey of officers suggesting that pressure to produce
annual crime reductions caused some precinct commanders to manipulate crime statistics).
103. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder,
and Fear, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MEETINGS 37,47-48 (Robert H. Langworthy ed., 1999).
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That said, the neglect of the fear of crime in both the order-
maintenance and land-use literatures is both unfortunate and curious. It
is unfortunate because fear of crime is a significant urban problem.
Throughout the last decade, for example, public opinion polls have re-
flected a sharp divergence between perceived crime rates and actual
ones, with respondents reporting a belief that crime was increasing even
when it was trending sharply downward." It is curious because Wilson
and Kelling admitted-on the first page of the Broken Windows essay-
that order-maintenance policing tactics do not necessarily reduce
crime.105 The essay was prompted by the Newark Foot Patrol Experi-
ment, which increased the presence of police officers "walking the beats"
instead of driving patrol cars.1" Kelling participated as the principal re-
searcher evaluating the program, which found, in Wilson and Kelling's
words, that "to the surprise of hardly anyone ... foot patrol[s] had not
reduced crime rates. '" 1° Despite this, however, "residents of the foot-
patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure..., tended to be-
lieve that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to
protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked,
for example)."1  Wilson and Kelling based their conclusion that foot pa-
trols made neighborhoods safer on this perception of security, not the re-
ality of reduced crime rates.1"
Wilson and Kelling's admission that foot patrols had not reduced
crime rates reflects their understanding, from its inception, that the or-
der-maintenance enterprise is not just about reducing serious crime. It is
also, importantly and perhaps primarily, about improving residents'
sense of security. This is a worthy and important goal because people
tend to systematically overestimate the threat of crime. Consider, for ex-
ample, the most recent evaluation of Chicago's Alternative Policing
Strategy (CAPS) program, a comprehensive community policing effort
that focuses on addressing crime and disorder at the neighborhood lev-
el.110 During the 1991-2002 period, in keeping with national trends, crime
declined dramatically in Chicago."' Promisingly, crime declined most
dramatically in the African American neighborhoods where violent
104. Joseph Carroll, Gallup Reviews Americans' Attitudes About Crime, GALLUP (June 16, 2006),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/23365/Gallup-Reviews-Americans-Attitudes-About-Crime.aspx.
105. Wilson & Kellig, supra note 20, at 29.
106. See POLICE FOUND., THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981).
107. Wilson & Kellig, supra note 20, at 29.
108. Id.
109. See generally id. (arguing that residents were not "fooled" and reasoning that the fact that
residents felt safer reflected a real level of security in the community).
110. See generally THE CHICAGO COMMUNITY POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, CAPS AT
TEN: COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO; AN EVOLUTION OF CHICAGO'S ALTERNATIVE POLICING
STRATEGY (2004) [hereinafter COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO].
111. Id.ativ.
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crime was disproportionately concentrated during the early 1990s."2 La-
tino neighborhoods also experienced sharper declines than white neigh-
borhoods."3 The survey data also suggested that fear of crime-which is
distinct from public perceptions of crime rates because it incorporates a
subjective assessment of personal vulnerability-also trended down-
ward.1 1 4 Between 1994 and 2003, fear of crime fell across cell demograph-
ic groups in Chicago-falling by ten percent among men and younger
people, two traditionally low-fear groups, and falling twenty percent
among women, African Americans, and older residents, groups that tra-
ditionally expressed the greatest level of fear."5
In other words, Chicago residents understood that their city was
getting safer, but they remained more pessimistic than they needed to be.
That is, crime trended downward far more sharply than either public
perceptions of crime or the fear of crime. The divergence between sur-
vey data and recorded crime was most dramatic in predominantly Span-
ish-speaking Latino neighborhoods; Spanish-speaking Latinos reported a
significant increase in crime despite the fact that official statistics sug-
gested a dramatic decline. "6
B. The Costs of Fear
The fear of crime imposes significant societal costs, many of which
are related to the fact that the fear of crime causes individuals to take
steps to prevent victimization. The costs of precautionary measures in-
clude:
1. The Economic Costs
Precaution taking is expensive. Americans spend more on private
crime-prevention measures than on the total U.S. law enforcement
budget. That is, Americans spend more to avoid being victimized than
U.S. governments at all levels (federal, state, and local) spend on police,
prosecutors, judges, and prisons. Estimates of the monetary cost of pri-
vate precautions range from 160 billion to 300 billion dollars per year-
figures that do not include the opportunity costs of remaining inside be-
hind locked doors to avoid victimization."7
112. Id. at v-vi.
113. Id. atv.
114. Id. Robbery declined by fifty-eight percent, rape by forty-five percent, murder by thirty per-
cent, aggravated assault by forty-one percent, burglary by fifty-one percent, and motor vehicle theft by
forty-seven percent. Id. at iv.
115. Id. at 70.
116. Id. at iv-vi.
117. See Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of
Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 308 (2006). Arguably, these law enforcement measures also
might be categorized as "costs" of fearfulness.
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2. The Social-Capital Costs
Monetary estimates of prevention-related expenditures also fail to
capture the social-capital costs of fear. Fear impedes a community's abil-
ity to generate and capitalize upon social capital in a number of ways.
The first is related to the social-influence effects of private precautions.
Social-influence theory predicts that people are more likely to obey the
law when they perceive that their neighbors are doing the same. But pri-
vate actions taken to avoid victimization cannot, by definition, support
such a perception. Logically, would-be victims should take steps to pro-
tect themselves from victimization only if they believe crime to be preva-
lent in their community. That is, the private deterrence measures that
fearful individuals are most likely to take-including neighborhood
watch groups, alarm systems, extra locks, bars on windows, etc.-tend to
signal that crime is prevalent in a community. Ironically, in other words,
steps taken to avoid crime may have the perverse effect of increasing its
prevalence by signaling-A la Broken Windows-that a community is
vulnerable to victimization.
Moreover, private precautions do not just send signals to criminals.
When a resident takes visible steps to prevent being victimized, he also
may signal to his neighbors that he does not trust them. And, even if
neighbors do not interpret precautionary measures as evincing a lack of
trust-perhaps because the community is plagued by criminals from oth-
er neighborhoods-the fear of crime likely reduces social capital because
the simplest and most common crime-avoidance strategy is to remain in-
doors. This "prisoner in my own home" phenomenon not only has the
effect of turning public spaces over to social deviants, but it also dramat-
ically curtails the informal, interneighbor socialization needed to build
social capital. "8 And, because collective efficacy and the fear of crime
have feedback effects on one another, crime avoidance can trigger a vi-
cious cycle-neighbors who are afraid of victimization do not get to
know one another, and the resulting social isolation in turn makes them
more frightened. Not surprisingly, numerous empirical studies have
demonstrated both that neighborhoods with low levels of collective effi-
cacy are more dangerous than those with higher levels and that residents
of such neighborhoods are also more fearful.119 Levels of perceived social
118. Wesley Skogan, Fear of Crime and Neighborhood Change, in 8 COMMUNITIES AND CRIME
203, 215-19 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1986).
119. See DAN A. LEWIS & GRETA SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF
A SOCIAL PROBLEM 15 (1986); Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 541-42 (collecting literature); Albert
Hunter & Terry L. Baumer, Street Traffic, Social Integration, and Fear of Crime, 52 SOC. INQUIRY 122,
127 (1982); Pamela Wilcox Roundtree & Kenneth C. Land, Burglary Victimization, Perceptions of
Crime Risk, and Routine Activities: A Multilevel Analysis Across Seattle Neighborhoods and Census
Tracts, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 147, 150 (1996).
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control have a greater effect on fear of crime than actual crime rates and
previous victimization. 10
3. Fear and Residential Sorting
Finally, and importantly, safety-reflected both in actual crime rates
and the perceived risk of victimization-strongly influences residential
location decisions. In his 1956 essay, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, Charles Tiebout influentially hypothesized that municipalities use
public goods to compete for residents, or "consumer voters.""12 Accord-
ing to the Tiebout model, residents "sort" themselves within a metropoli-
tan area according to their preferences for public goods and municipal
services, which municipalities package and offer as an inducement to re-
locate.122 As Tiebout observed, "Every resident who moves to the sub-
urbs to find better schools, more parks, and so forth, is reacting, in part,
against the pattern the city has to offer."'23 Although Tiebout did not
mention it specifically, safety undoubtedly is one of the public goods in-
fluencing residential sorting.
The Tieboutian case for safe city neighborhoods is not merely a
theoretical one. In one nationwide study, Julie Berry Cullen and Steven
Levitt found a strong correlation between crime and urban flight: each
reported city crime correlated with a one-person decline in city popula-
tion; "[a ten percent] increase in crime correspond[ed] to a [one percent]
decline in city population."1 4 Cullen and Levitt also found that residents
motivated to move by fear of crime were more likely to remain in the
same metropolitan area than those moving for other reasons, which sug-
gests that the fear of crime encourages residents to move to the sub-
urbs.1 25 And, importantly, even studies that question the connection be-
tween fear and migration to the suburbs suggest that crime exerts a
relatively strong, and negative, influence on in-migration-that is, on res-
idents' decisions to move from the suburbs to the city. 26 Moreover, Cul-
len and Levitt's study focused on the connection between actual crime
and migration between cities and their suburbs. 27 It is reasonable to as-
sume that the fear of crime also influences residents' decisions about
120. See, e.g., Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 552, 558-59; Lee & Earnest, supra note 49, at 138.
121. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-19
(1956).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 420.
124. Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities,
81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 159 (1999).
125. See id. at 166.
126. See, e.g., Martin T. Katzman, The Contribution of Crime to Urban Decline, 17 URB. STUD.
277 (1980). But see Cullen & Levitt, supra note 124, at 159 ("[Tlhe link between changes in crime and
in-migration appears weak.").
127. See generally Cullen & Levitt, supra note 124 (examining the connection between fear of
crime and out-migration to suburbs).
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whether to move from one city neighborhood to another. As a result,
safer neighborhoods enjoy greater residential stability-that is, relatively
low levels of resident turnover and high levels of homeownership -than
more dangerous ones.
This connection between fear of crime and residential stability is
important because residential stability is strongly correlated with collec-
tive efficacy. 128 In a major study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods, Robert
Sampson, Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls found that residential
stability, measured by average residential tenure and levels of homeown-
ership, was one of three major factors explaining neighborhood variation
in collective efficacy, and that collective efficacy, in turn, mediated the
negative effects of the other two factors-economic disadvantage and
immigration-enough to reduce violent crime in a neighborhood. 129
These findings are consistent with other social-science research linking
residential tenure and homeownership, especially of single-family homes,
with high levels of collective efficacy.3 ' Moreover, although homeown-
ers move far less often than renters,131 highly educated, wealthier house-
holds with children also are most likely to relocate when they become
fearful.'32 These likely-to-relocate homeowners are also the very resi-
dents most needed to promote collective efficacy. In other words, there
is strong empirical evidence suggesting that cities that succeed in con-
vincing residents and would-be residents that they are, relatively speak-
ing, safe-by actually reducing crime rates, by increasing collective effi-
cacy, or by undertaking policing practices which bolster residents' sense
of security-are more likely to prosper than those that fail to do so. Fi-
nally, it is important to remember that the individuals most affected by
crime are those who cannot afford residential choices. There is little
128. Sampson et al., supra note 47, at 921.
129. See id. at 920-23.
130. See, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 610 ("Systematic theories of urban
communities have long pointed to the importance of residential stability as a major feature of urban
social organization." (citation omitted)). The connection between homeownership, residential tenure,
and collective efficacy is easily explained. A resident's social integration into a neighborhood natural-
ly increases over time, increasing the likelihood that he or she will build the kind of trust relationships
with neighbors that forms the foundation of collective efficacy. See Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 552.
Homeowners also have obvious financial incentives to organize with one another to address neighbor-
hood problems that more-temporary residents lack.
131. The Census Bureau reports that in 2009, renters were more than five times more likely to
move than homeowners. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Reports Residents
Move at Higher Rate in 2009 After Record Low in 2008 (May 10, 2010), http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/mobility.ofthe-population/cbl0-67.html. See also Press Release, U.S.
Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports Housing Is Top Reason People Moved Between 2009 and
2010 (May 23, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/mobilityofjthe-population/
cbll-91.html; Ilyce Glink, Underwater with Your Mortgage? So Are a Growing Number of Homeown-
ers, CBS MONEY WATCH.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/spendinglbloghome-
equity/underwater-with-your-mortgage-so-are-a-growing-number-of-hmeowners/1699 (reporting
that twenty-four percent of U.S. residential properties with mortgages were in a negative equity situa-
tion at the end of 2009).
132. See Cullen & Levitt, supra note 124, at 160.
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question that many of the poorest urban residents are constantly vulner-
able to serious crime precisely because they cannot afford to move away
from crime-plagued urban neighborhoods.
C. Fear Fuelers
Although the fear of crime is not well understood, levels of fearful-
ness are likely influenced by a number of factors, including the following:
1. Risk of Victimization
For many years, conventional wisdom held that crime was the pri-
mary driver of the fear of crime. It is now clear, however, that the asso-
ciation between fear and the actual risk of victimization is more compli-
cated than traditionally assumed. For example, somewhat paradoxically,
the groups with the highest levels of fear-women and the elderly-have
the lowest rates of victimization; and the group with the lowest rate of
fear-young men-has the highest rate of victimization.'33  Moreover,
while most research suggests that prior direct experience with crime is
weakly correlated with increased fear, the evidence is mixed, with some
studies suggesting-paradoxically-that victims report lower levels of
fear for certain crimes.'34
As the above discussion of the CAPS report suggests, moreover, we
are more afraid of victimization than we need to be. That is, levels of
fear exceed levels of crime.' This reality is usually explained by the the-
ory of "indirect victimization," which posits that hearing about other
people's experiences with crime frightens us.136 Especially because media
accounts frequently focus on the least common, most gruesome, and bi-
zarre crimes, we tend to distort the extent and distribution of violent
crime. 37 This distortion may result from a cognitive bias known as the
133. Jeanette Covington & Ralph B. Taylor, Fear of Crime in Urban Residential Neighborhoods:
Implications of Between- and Within-Neighborhood Sources for Current Models, 32 SoC. Q. 231,
231-32 (1991); Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 540; Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Neighborhood Disor-
der, Integration, and the Fear of Crime, 14 JUST. Q. 479, 484 (1997); Miethe, supra note 102, at 19; see
also James Garofalo & John Laub, The Fear of Crime: Broadening Our Perspective, 3 VICTIMOLOGY
242 (1978).
134. See Wesley G. Skogan, The Impact of Victimization on Fear, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 135, 137
(1987) (discussing research).
135. On the connection between crime and fear, see Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 540, which
discusses literature, and Skogan, supra note 134. See also Lauren B. Gates & William M. Rohe, Fear
and Reactions to Crime: A Revised Model, 22 URB. AFF. Q. 425,427 (1987). On the possibility that vic-
timization may sometimes reduce fear, see RICHARD F. SPARKS ET AL., SURVEYING VICTIMS: A
STUDY OF THE MEASUERMENT OF CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME, AND
ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1977).
136. Covington & Taylor, supra note 133, at 232; see also 124 WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G.
MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME: INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS 163-82 (1981).
137. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV.
237, 248-49 (2008).
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
"availability heuristic." Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that,
when making a decision, people tend to rely on information that is readi-
ly available to them rather than considering other alternatives. '38 Thus,
because sensationalist reporting makes more-violent crimes more "avail-
able" to us, we fear the worst when, in fact, the risk of less-serious crimes
(for example, property crimes) is far higher.'39
2. Disorder
While the causal connection between disorder and crime is hotly
contested, the connection between disorder and the fear of crime is not.
The available research universally suggests a strong positive correlation
between disorder and fear. Apparently, the average observer intuitively
agrees with the broken windows hypothesis: when the observer experi-
ences disorder or experiences social incivilities in a neighborhood, he or
she assumes that serious crime is prevalent there as well. Indeed, some
evidence suggests that disorder generates more fear of crime than actual
personal experience with crime itself.14°
Disorder generates fear at both the neighborhood and individual
levels. At the neighborhood level, higher levels of neighborhood disor-
der correspond to higher levels of fear of crime among residents. 4 ' At
the individual level, residents within the same neighborhood experience
different levels of fear depending upon their individual perceptions of
the amount of disorder in their communities. That is, the more disorder
a person sees, the more fearful the person is. For example, Jeanette Cov-
ington and Ralph Taylor interviewed over 1500 residents about the levels
of disorder in sixty-six Baltimore neighborhoods and then compared
these responses to physical assessments of neighborhood conditions con-
ducted by trained observers.'42 They found that fear was most strongly
influenced by the disorder levels within a respondent's neighborhood.'43
Residents of neighborhoods with higher levels of observed physical and
social disorder were more fearful.'44 They also found that individual per-
ceptions of disorder were strongly linked to individualized, within-
neighborhood differences in fear.4 ' Residents who saw more disorder
138. See Covington & Taylor, supra note 133, at 232; Gates & Rohe, supra note 135, at 439.
139. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124,1127-28 (1974).
140. See Randy L. LaGrange et al., Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime: Role of Social and Physical
Incivilities, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 311, 312-13, 327-28 (1992).
141. Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 541; McGarrell et al., supra note 133, at 493-94.
142. Covington & Taylor, supra note 133, at 234-35.
143. Id. at 241.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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than their neighbors or expressed greater concern about disorder experi-
enced more fear.'46
Disorder also suppresses collective efficacy, which is an important
predictor of both fear of crime and residential stability. 147 Logically, we
have less reason to fear victimization if we trust our neighbors to inter-
vene and enforce informal norms of conduct. It also is reasonable to ex-
pect that communities with high levels of collective efficacy will be less
disorderly; after all, members of cohesive communities with high levels of
social capital are most likely to organize informally to keep disorder in
check. For example, in their important study of the effects of disorder in
Chicago neighborhoods, Sampson and Raudenbush found no significant
correlation between disorder and serious crimes other than robbery.
14
They also found that collective efficacy was significantly and negatively
correlated with disorder. 49 While these findings led Sampson and
Raudenbush to question the causal link between disorder and serious
crime, they did not dismiss disorder as irrelevant. Disorder, they sug-
gested, might "turn out to be important for understanding migration pat-
terns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability," es-
pecially if it "operates in a cascading fashion-encouraging people to
move (increasing residential instability) or discouraging efforts at build-
ing collective responses."'150
3. Strangers
The fear of crime also has been linked to the fear of strangers. This
asserted link between strangers and fear has been explained in various
ways. Some scholars have argued that the fear of crime is, at heart, a fear
of the unpredictable, including unknown and unpredictable people.'
Others have linked strangers to a decline in trust, which in turn triggers
fear. This claim about the fear of crime is supported by the research dis-
cussed above, which suggests that commercial land uses suppress neigh-
146. Id.
147. See Gibson et al., supra note 49, at 552; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
148. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 14, at 630.
149. Id. at 624.
150. Id. at 637.
151. See, e.g., James Brooks, The Fear of Crime in the United States, 20 CRIME & DELINQ. 241,241
(1974) ("The fear of crimes of violence is not a simple fear of injury or death or even of all crimes of
violence, but, at bottom, a fear of strangers."); Jennie McIntyre, Public Attitudes Toward Crime and
Law Enforcement, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 66, 72 (1967) ("The precautions which people take to protect
themselves indicate that underlying the fear of crime is a profound fear of strangers. They are afraid
that some unknown person will accost them on the street or break into their homes and take their
property or attack them personally."); Marc Riedel, Stranger Violence: Perspectives, Issues, and Prob-
lems, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 223, 223 (1987) ("[Tihe fear of crime is basically a fear of
strangers. It is suggested that people fear the unknown person who commits an unpredictable and
violent attack on a vulnerable and innocent citizen going about routine daily activities.").
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borhood social cohesion by inviting strangers into a community.112 If, as
this research suggests, social cohesion suppresses fear, then it is reasona-
ble to believe that strangers increase fear since strangers tend to suppress
social cohesion by making it more difficult for residents to discern who
"belongs" in their neighborhood.
A related but distinct claim is that the fear of strangers is, at heart, a
fear of "strangeness"-that is, of "undesirable" strangers, including, un-
fortunately, racial minorities.'53 This final explanation is supported by ev-
idence suggesting that the cognitive heuristics that we use to distinguish
"safe" from "threatening" strangers track social categories. Young men,
for example, are most likely to provoke fear.54 Moreover, fear-inducing
social incivilities tend to be associated with certain subcategories of indi-
viduals, including, for example, teenagers and individuals suffering from
mental illness.'55 The claim that fear of crime is linked to fear of
"strangeness" also is supported by evidence suggesting that perceptions
of disorder and crime are not race blind but are instead higher in pre-
dominantly minority neighborhoods.'56 For example, when Sampson and
Raudenbush compared levels of actual physical and social disorder in
Chicago neighborhoods to surveys asking residents to report the level of
disorder in their neighborhoods,'157 they found that factors other than ac-
152. See supra text accompanying notes 53-66.
153. Hunter & Baumer, supra note 119, at 129 ("Fear of strangers might more accurately be de-
fined as fear of strange types of people in strange settings at strange times of the day."); Deborah
Lupton, Dangerous Places and the Unpredictable Stranger: Constructions of Fear of Crime, 32 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1999) ("Safety was frequently described as involving the area being 'qui-
et', often combined with other attributes, such as the other residents being affluent, or there being no
undesirable types hanging around .... "); Rachel Pain, Place, Social Relations and the Fear of Crime: A
Review, 24 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 365, 373 ("[Tjhere is a general tendency to fear stereotypi-
cal 'others' who are marked out by their colour, class or other impurity and whose presence threatens
disorder to mainstream life and values.").
154. See generally 9 ROBERT F. MEIER ET AL., THE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE OF CRIME:
CRIMINAL EVENTS AND CRIME ANALYSIS 222-23 (2001) (finding that fear was substantially increased
by the presence of young males).
155. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma
and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 321 (2004) (finding that
residents perceived more disorder in African American neighborhoods). The link between fear of
crime and the fear of strangers has long been widely accepted. But see Elizabeth H. McConnell, Fear
of Crime and Victimization, in CONTROVERSIES IN VICTIMOLOGY 91, 97 (Laura J. Moriarty ed., 2d ed.
2008) (reviewing literature). Any assertions about the "fear of strangers" rest on intuition rather than
rigorous efforts to test intuitive claim, leading some to question its empirical foundation. Dan A. Lew-
is, Crime and Community: Continuities, Contradictions, and Complexities, CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. &
RES., May 1996, at 95, 103 (asserting that the "fear of strangers" claim has not been empirically tested
but rather is offered as a theoretical explanation for other empirical findings).
156. See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Ra-
cial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. Soc. 717, 726-28, 740-43 (2002)
(finding, based upon resident surveys and police data from Seattle, Chicago, and Baltimore, a positive
association between the percentage of young, black men and perceptions of neighborhood crime).
157. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 155, at 323-27. Sampson and Raudenbush enlisted
trained observers, driving SUVs, to videotape the physical and social conditions in 500 "block groups"
in Chicago neighborhoods. Id. at 325-26. To measure perceptions of disorder, they relied on a 1995
survey of 3585 Chicago residents. Id. at 324.
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tual disorder-including race-colored residents' perceptions of disorder
in a neighborhood.'58 Black residents perceived less disorder than white
residents living in the same neighborhood. "9 And, importantly, the racial
composition of a neighborhood affected residents' perception of disorder
levels, with residents perceiving higher levels of disorder as the percent-
age of minority residents (and especially African American residents) in-
creased.60 Interestingly, they found that the effects of neighborhood ra-
cial composition on resident perception of disorder held true across
races. That is, "blacks were not significantly more or less likely than
whites to view predominantly black neighborhoods as high in disor-
der.,) 61
4. Being Alone
Less prevalent in the literature on the fear of crime is a discussion of
another powerful fear fueler: we are afraid of being alone. Intuitively, at
least in urban public spaces, social isolation-that is, aloneness-
provokes fear. As Mark Warr, the author of one of the most systematic
studies linking the fear of crime to the fear of being alone, has observed,
"[B]eing alone in a truly dangerous environment is the stuff of night-
mares." 62
Warr's research drew upon a 1987 survey asking respondents to
consider a series of situational vignettes and to indicate (on a zero-to-ten
scale) how afraid they would be in the situation.'63 The vignettes were
designed to test the effects of novelty (that is, being in a strange place),
darkness, and the presence of others on the fear of victimization. For
example, one of the vignettes stated: "You are waiting on (a crowded/an
empty) street corner downtown (in the afternoon/at night) in an area you
(know well/do not know well)."'16 Warr found that all three factors-that
is, unfamiliarity with a situation (or novelty), darkness, and being
alone-increased fear, but that the effects of each varied along with the
respond-ent's age and sex.'65 Young men were least afraid in all of the
situations, and older women were the most afraid. 66 Darkness had the
greatest effect on fear levels in all of the gender/age combinations. 67 The
"aloneness" factor had the greatest effect on young women: when they
158. Id. at 329-31.
159. Id. at 329.
160. Id. at 332.
161. Id.
162. Mark Warr, Dangerous Situations: Social Context and the Fear of Victimization, 68 Soc.
FORCES 891,895 (1990).
163. Id. at 895-906.
164. Id. at 903.
165. Id. at 898.
166. Id. at 899.
167. Id. at 898, 902.
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were alone, young women were almost as afraid as older women (the
highest fear group).168 Interestingly, Warr found that while the presence
of others worked to alleviate fear in situations where crime is not immi-
nent or in progress, the "safety in numbers" reaction disappeared when
respondents were presented with a vignette suggesting they saw a man
with a knife.169 Warr concluded from this that being in the presence of
known dangerous people does not increase our sense of security, al-
though he hypothesized that being in the presence of "moderately dan-
gerous persons" may be less frightening than being alone.110
Studies conducted with the goal of identifying and overcoming im-
pediments to more intense use of public amenities, especially of public
transportation, also suggest that the presence of other people in public
spaces, especially at night, reduces the fear of crime. For example, a sur-
vey conducted of park and bus users in Los Angeles found that more
than three-quarters of women stated that they would never visit a park
after dark except to take part in a well-attended event, such as a con-
cert.17" ' Similarly, respondents listed being alone-along with encounters
with social incivilities and past victimizations-as a primary reason they
feared taking public transportation.' These results comport with a
number of studies identifying the fear of being alone in unguarded areas
as an impediment to the use of public transportation, especially by wom-
en.'73 In keeping with Newman's work on "defensible space," people also
report that they avoid public transportation stops with physical barriers
that heighten the sense of isolation and prevent monitoring by passers-
by.'74 And, again in keeping with the literature connecting fear to physi-
cal and social disorder, researchers have found the presence of disorderly
people provokes greater fear reactions than physical incivilities.'75
The fact that we experience a feeling of "safety in numbers"-that
is, we believe that the presence of others increases our personal safety-
168. Id. at 898-99. Warr hypothesized that young women's fear reaction to being alone was trig-
gered by their vulnerability to rape. Id. at 902.
169. Id. at 903-05.
170. Id. at 905. Wart also demonstrated that respondents' security/fear reactions mapped onto
expected demographic characteristics. They felt more threatened by younger men and safer around
older women. He did not test racial characteristics. Women-the group most likely to avoid public
transportation unless other passengers are present-are apparently more fearful when they are in the
presence of a single other passenger than when they are alone. Id. at 903-06.
171. Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Is It Safe to Walk Here? Design and Policy Responses to Wom-
en's Fear of Victimization in Publix Places, 2 RES. ON WOMEN'S ISSUES TRANSP. 102,105-06 (2005).
172. See ANASTASIA LOUKAITOU-SIDERIS ET AL., MINETA TRANSP. INST., Report No. 09-01,
How TO EASE WOMEN'S FEAR OF TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENTS: CASE STUDIES AND BEST
PRACTICES 7-8 (2009).
173. Id. at 16-17.
174. Id. at 7 (reviewing literature).
175. See id.; see also Thomas L. Austin & Eve S. Buzawa, Citizen Perceptions on Mass Transit
Crime and Its Deterrence: A Case Study, 38 TRANSP. Q. 103 (1984); Gerald Ingalls et al., Public Fear of
Crime and Its Role in Bus Transit Use, TRANSP. RES. REC. No.1433 201 (1994); Gill Valentine, Wom-
en's Fear and the Design of Public Space, 16 BUILT ENV'T 288 (1990).
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also is supported by evidence suggesting that individual vigilance de-
creases as crowd size increases. This phenomenon-that individuals take
less care to detect and avoid threats to personal safety when they are in
crowds rather than alone-is present across species' 76 including hu-
mans. 7 For example, several studies have demonstrated that the fre-
quency of individuals "scanning"-that is, looking around to evaluate a
situation-decreases as group size increases.178 This effect of group size
on vigilance may also help explain the "bystander effect"-that is, the
fact that the probability of a given individual intervening to help in an
emergency situation (including criminal victimization) also decreases as
crowd size increases. Decades of research-which was initially triggered
by the notorious Kitty Genovese incident, during which a young woman
was murdered in broad daylight while dozens of witnesses watched pas-
sively- has confirmed the bystander effect in numerous settings.179
Psychologists have suggested that the bystander effect may be the
result of a diffusion of responsibility. That is, if each member of a group
believes that someone else is responsible for intervening to address the
problem, then no individual member will take the initiative to intervene.
An alternative, or supplemental, explanation flows from the possible so-
cial-influence effects of nonintervention, which signals a norm of inac-
tion. In one well-known experiment, for example, undergraduate stu-
dents at Columbia University were asked to participate in a discussion of
176. See, e.g., Som B. Ale & Joel S. Brown, The Contingencies of Group Size and Vigilance, 9
EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY RES. 1263 (2007); Guy Beauchamp, What Is the Magnitude of the Group-
Size Effect on Vigilance?, 19 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 1361 (2008); Mark A. Elgar, Predator Vigilance and
Group Size in Mammals and Birds: A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence, 64 BIOLOGICAL REV.
13 (1989).
177. See, e.g., R.I.M. Dunbar et al., Vigilance in Humans: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses, 139
BEHAVIOR 695 (2002).
178. See David P. Barash, Human Ethology: The Snack-Bar Security Syndrome, 31 PSYCHOL.
REP. 577 (1972) (comparing the levels of scanning among individuals dining in groups as well as at-wall
versus center seating, and finding the solitary individuals and those in center seating scanned more
frequently than individuals seated in groups and along walls); Monika Wawra, Vigilance Patterns in
Humans, 107 BEHAVIOR 61 (1988) (finding that the mean time between "scanning" increased along
with group size); Peter Wirtz & Monika Wawra, Vigilance and Group Size in Homo Sapiens, 71
ETHOLOGY 283 (1986) (observing scanning behavior in a college cafeteria and finding that students
looked up less frequently as group size increased-individuals dining alone spent 16.8 seconds per
minute looking up whereas individuals in groups only 2.9 seconds). Cf. Dunbar et al., supra note 177
(conducting a similar study and suggesting that decreased "scanning" in groups is related to mate-
seeking behavior rather than vigilance).
179. See, e.g., Bibb Latan6 & Steve Nida, Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping, 89
PSYCHOL. BULL. 308 (1981) (summarizing a decade of research). The early research on the bystander
effect, which was conducted by John M. Darley and Bibb Latan6, remains influential. See BIBB
LATANI & JOHN M. DARLEY, HELP IN A CRISIS: BYSTANDER RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY (1976);
BIBB LATANt & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE HELP?
(1970) [hereinafter LATANt & DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER]; John M. Darley & Bibb
Latand, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); John M. Darley & Bibb Latan6, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in
Emergencies, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968) [hereinafter Darley & Latand, Group
Inhibition].
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urban college life.' 8° When the students arrived, they were directed to a
waiting room and asked to complete a survey.' After several minutes,
the researchers begin to pump smoke into the room through an air condi-
tioning vent.12 Students sitting alone in the room responded fairly quick-
ly to the smoke-with most reporting the smoke within two minutes and
seventy-five percent reporting the problem before the experiment was
terminated 83 When seated in the room with two other students, only
thirty-eight percent of the subjects reported the smoke, and, when seated
with other students who were "in on" the experiment and ignored the
smoke, only one out of ten subjects took any action at all during the ex-
perimental period.' 4 The remainder sat passively, fanning the smoke
away from their face in order to complete a questionnaire provided by
the researchers. 8 5 As the researchers observed, inaction in this situation
is unlikely to be the result of a diffusion of responsibility, since the smoke
posed a threat to all of the subjects rather than a third party in an emer-
gency situation. 86 Instead, it seemed likely that each subject's hesitation
to intervene sent mutually reinforcing cues that stigmatized interven-
tion. 187
IV. THE PEOPLE PARADOX AND THE LAND-USE POLICING NEXUS
While there are plausible evolutionary explanations for the "safety
in numbers" intuition,' 8' the intuition sometimes works at cross-purposes
with the goal of personal safety, at least in urban neighborhoods. To
begin, a common reaction to crowd size-decreased vigilance -likely
leaves us more vulnerable to victimization. If we "let our guard down"
because we feel safe in crowds, we open ourselves up to threats that
might be detected and prevented by greater vigilance. Moreover, the
empirical literature on land-use patterns discussed above suggests that, as
the number of people present in a community increases, so does the
prevalence of other fear fuelers - strangers (including potential victim-
izers), disorder, and crime. These fear fuelers, in turn, serve to suppress
neighborhood collective efficacy, which itself is a primary predictor of
neighborhood crime levels. Herein lies the People Paradox: we feel safer
in groups, perhaps because we are hardwired to believe that there is safe-
180. LATANP & DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 179, at 43-45.
181. Id. at 45-46.
182. Id. at 46.
183. Id. at 46-47.
184. Id. at 47-49.
185. Id. at 48.
186. Id. at 52.
187. Id. at 51-52.
188. See, e.g., Warr, supra note 162, at 895 ("One of the most readily observable characteristics of
many animal species in the wild is their tendency to avoid separation from conspecifics, one example
being the common tendency to herd.").
[Vol. 2012
THE PEOPLE PARADOX
ty in numbers. Therefore, we avoid deserted urban places -especially at
night-because we associate social isolation with vulnerability to crime.
But, paradoxically, as the number of people in urban spaces increases, so
does the likelihood of victimization (and the prevalence of other factors
that signal a vulnerability to victimization).
The People Paradox thus presents a dilemma to urban policy mak-
ers who wish simultaneously to promote urban vitality and to reduce
crime. The People Paradox suggests, contra Jacobs and the new
urbanists, that mixed-land-use planning is not a magic bullet to cure all
urban woes. Mixing land uses might generate the busyness and vitality
needed to encourage more-intense use of public spaces. But, the sense of
security engendered by the mixing of land uses does not necessarily
comport with reality. Busy streets may feel safer; but quiet streets usual-
ly are safer. This section reflects upon several possible legal-policy reac-
tions to this People Paradox. It ultimately concludes that the People
Paradox is suggestive of a real and persistent tension between different
urban policy goals-a tension that land-use policy, standing alone, is ill
equipped to address.
A. Nudging, Debiasing, and Zoning
One reaction to the evidence linking commercial land uses to in-
creased crime and disorder and decreased collective efficacy would be to
reject calls for a greater mixing of land uses than permitted by traditional
zoning laws. Perhaps the strict enforcement-and even enhancement-
of regulations restricting commercial activity in urban environments is in
order. Ralph Taylor, an environmental psychologist and the author of a
number of studies of the land use and disorder nexus, suggests just that.
Taylor asserts that city officials "may wish to carefully monitor zoning
variance requests, business license requests, and code enforcement in
neighborhoods at risk of increasing crime.., because of the implications
such decisions may have for informal social control and crime."' 9 Addi-
tionally, since organic methods of suppressing disorder and generating
social capital and collective efficacy-such as longer residential tenures
and homeownership - are likely more robust and effective than the pub-
licly sponsored ones that take center stage in many order-maintenance
toolkits,' 9° policy makers reasonably might be attracted to land-use poli-
cies that encourage homeownership, including single-land-use zoning,
which homeowners view as a form of property-value insurance191
189. Taylor et al., supra note 53, at 132.
190. See generally Livingston, supra note 26, at 578-84 (describing community policing tech-
niques).
191. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY
LINES 39-44 (2009) (arguing that land-use controls are "product stabilizers" for homeownership);
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
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If the "safety in numbers" intuition presents an impediment to this
strategy, urban policy makers conceivably could undertake efforts to
overcome it. This intuition apparently reflects an example of what be-
havioral economists refer to as "bounded rationality. '"1 9 Bounded ra-
tionality is simply a way of stating that humans, for various reasons,
sometimes employ inaccurate mental and emotional heuristics to make
decisions. For example, the "safety in numbers" assumption is an appar-
ently inaccurate heuristic used to gauge the risk of victimization in urban
spaces: we are afraid to be alone, even though our risk of victimization
increases along with crowd size. In other words, we are irrational. The
"safety in numbers" intuition also might be fairly characterized, in psy-
chological terms, as an instantiation of the "affect heuristic." The affect
heuristic simplifies judgmental processes by focusing our decisions upon
our subjective evaluations (positive or negative) of the consequences of
possible outcomes rather than the probability that these outcomes will
occur. The risk of a very bad outcome-for example, murder or rape-
leads us to overweight small probabilities.'93 Cass Sunstein has referred
to this phenomenon as "probability neglect," observing that "probability
neglect is especially large when people focus on the worst possible case
or otherwise are subject to strong emotions. When such emotions are at
work, people do not give sufficient consideration to the likelihood that
the worst case will actually occur."'94 And, the logical converse of this
point is that people may underestimate events that are more likely but
have devastating results. There is evidence that probability neglect can
generate excessive demand for regulation of risks that have very low
probabilities but generate a strong affect. 9' For example, in the criminal
law context, fear of violent crime may generate excessive demand for po-
lice presence in public spaces or for lengthy prison terms for repeat vio-
lent offenders.
Economists and cognitive psychologists have begun to explore ways
that the law might be used to "debias" or "nudge" individuals toward ful-
ly rational behavior by reducing or eliminating systematic errors of
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 50-56 (2001) (arguing that
homeowners see zoning as property-value insurance).
192. See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482,484-85 (2002) (defining and describing bounded rationality). The
concept of bounded rationality was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon. See Herbert A. Simon,
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice
and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956).
193. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
194. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 67
(2002).
195. See id. at 87-91; see also AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFTEY ISSUES 271-73 (1995) (discussing the phenomenon in a food-
safety context).
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judgment that lead to suboptimal behavior. 196 The "debiasing" scholar-
ship suggests various techniques that the law might employ to overcome
systematic cognitive errors and further suggests that some of them are
more effective than others."9  For example, providing accurate infor-
mation about actual risk does not serve to overcome the affect bias. On
the contrary, it usually makes people more fearful. As Sunstein ob-
serves, "Studies show that when people discuss a low-probability risk,
their concern rises even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently
trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm really is infinitesi-
mal."'98 Irrational concerns about risk, it turns out, are particularly diffi-
cult to overcome.99
B. The People Paradox As an Urban-Development Tool
Even assuming that legal tools could be effectively employed to de-
bunk the assumption that there is safety in numbers, officials might rea-
sonably hesitate before further codifying single-land-use patterns. Rich-
ard Posner has observed that behavioral law and economics should have
"at least one clear normative implication: that efforts should be made...
to cure the cognitive quirks... that prevent people from acting rationally
with no offsetting gains."2°° But in the urban-policy context, there are at
least three related reasons to conclude that the "safety in numbers" as-
sumption does generate offsetting gains. Thus, it is not at all clear that
convincing people to avoid crowds would maximize societal utility.
1. The Costs of Crowd Avoidance
To begin, debiasing people of their "safety in numbers" intuition
necessarily would entail convincing them to be more afraid of other peo-
ple than they already are. There are reasons, unrelated to crime minimi-
zation, that this path might be worse than permitting people to persist in
the belief that there is safety in numbers. As discussed previously, com-
mon crime-avoidance techniques, such as remaining inside behind closed
doors, impose high costs on society. Therefore, to the extent that we feel
safer in crowds (even when we are not), the People Paradox may reduce
the opportunity costs of fear by causing people to engage in beneficial
196. See Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789,791 (2007); Christine Jolls
& Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,199-200 (2006).
197. See Tor, supra note 137,237,298-300 (reviewing experimental literature).
198. Sunstein, supra note 194, at 69 n.38.
199. See Gary W. Cordner, Fear of Crime and the Police: An Evaluation of a Fear-Reduction
Strategy, 14 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 223, 223 (1986); Brian C. Renauer, Reducing Fear of Crime: Citi-
zen, Police, or Government Responsibility?, 10 POLICE Q. 41,54-57 (2007); Jihong "Solomon" Zhao et
al., The Effect of Police Presence on Public Fear Reduction and Satisfaction: A Review of the Literature,
15 JUST. PROF. 273, 281 (2002).
200. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551,1575 (1998).
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activities-including activities that build much-needed social and eco-
nomic capital in our cities. On a related note, the literature testing the
contours of the "bystander effect," discussed above, suggests that even
occasional and informal social interactions increase the likelihood that
bystanders will intervene to prevent crimes.20 1 While deep social connec-
tions between neighbors undoubtedly are superior to shallow ones in
promoting vigilance, 2° experimental psychologists have demonstrated
that even shallow interactions can encourage prosocial behavior. For ex-
ample, when subjects have spoken to each other for as little as one min-
ute, they are far more likely to intervene to help one another than if they
have not interacted at all.2 3 And, of course, it is also possible that
debiasing residents of their "safety in numbers" intuition also might work
at cross-purposes with efforts to overcome other, more pernicious bias-
es-including those based upon class and race.
2. The People Paradox and Urban-Suburban Competition
Another legal response to cognitive biases is to take steps to ensure
that the law is not shaped by demands resulting from systematic errors in
judgment.2' 4 In the land-use context, this might entail rejecting demands
for regulatory reforms permitting a greater mixing of land uses-at least
to the extent that such demands are fueled by the mistaken assumption
that mixed-land-use communities will be safer and more socially cohesive
than exclusively residential ones. But, in the urban-policy context, de-
mands for more "urban" land-use environments clearly are not fueled
primarily by the new urbanists' claim that mixed-land-use neighborhoods
are safer than single-land-use ones. Rather, they are fueled primarily by
city leaders' desire to compete with suburbs for residents and businesses
by capitalizing on the growing taste for urban life. This reality directly
highlights why the People Paradox is suggestive of what may be an inevi-
table tension in urban land-use policy. City competitiveness and urban
neighborhood health requires attention to levels of crime and social capi-
tal in urban neighborhoods, and both concerns arguably weigh in favor of
rejecting calls for more land-use diversity. But, as I have previously ar-
gued, if cities have one major competitive edge over their suburban
201. See R. Lance Shotland & Lynne I. Goodstein, The Role of Bystanders in Crime Control, 40 J.
Soc. ISSUES 9,12-13 (1984).
202. See Mark Levine & Simon Crowther, The Responsive Bystander: How Social Group Mem-
bership and Group Size Can Encourage As Well As Inhibit Bystander Intervention, 95 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1429, 1437 (2008) (finding that the bystander effect emerged only when bystanders
were constructed as strangers).
203. See LATANt & DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 179, at 107-09.
204. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1165 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002).
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counterparts, it is urban vitality. And urban vitality is promoted by the
mixed-land-use policies that are linked to increased crime.205
To understand the importance of urban vitality, and the land-use
regulations that promote it, it is necessary to come to terms with the rea-
sons for the apparent "urban rebound" of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. Not only was the 1990s the best postwar decade
for those U.S. cities that previously suffered the most devastating popula-
tion losses, but the population growth of many downtowns-the most
"urban" areas-outpaced overall population growth in many cities.
Some cities experienced overall population losses but still saw their
downtown population grow." 6 Even poor neighborhoods began to re-
generate, sometimes enough to raise gentrification concerns. 7 And
while the current economic downturn has dampened enthusiasm about
the urban resurgence, urban leaders have reason to remain cautiously
optimistic about the future.2 8
While the urban rebound is a complex phenomenon, 2 Glaeser and
Gottlieb provide a plausible summary explanation. They argued, as dis-
cussed briefly above, that cities have rebounded because elites increas-
ingly have an affinity for urban life, especially the social interactions and
consumer amenities enabled by dense, mixed-land-use urban environ-
ments.210  The reasons for the shift in lifestyle preferences, Glaeser and
Gottlieb posit, include rising incomes and educational attainment and,
importantly, a dramatic decline in central-city crime rates. 11 Over the
past two to three decades, as crime rates fell and urban officials began to
focus on the quality of life in public places, city dwellers found it easier to
enjoy the advantages of urban life.2 12  Similarly, historian Robert
Bruegmann has argued that the decline in the urban industrial base has
freed cities from congestion, pollution, and disease and made them more
attractive to wealthy individuals who might previously have chosen to
live in the suburbs.213
Perhaps not surprisingly, many cities now pin urban development
hopes on promoting a "hip" image. Michigan, for example, has launched
a "Cool Cities Initiative" with the explicit goal of encouraging Michigan
205. See Garnett, supra note 4, at 44-46.
206. Sohmer & Lang, supra note 2, at 65-67.
207. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405 (2003); John A.
Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old "One-Two": Gentrification and the K.O. of
Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433 (2003).
208. See generally Conor Dougherty, Cities Grow at Suburbs' Expense During Recession, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 2009, at A5 (discussing census data suggesting that population growth in large cities has
outpaced suburban growth during the recession).
209. See Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Develop-
ment, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311,324-31 (2010).
210. See Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 1288-93.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 1297.
213. See BRUEGMANN,supra note 32, at 221.
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cities to retain and attract more people including urban pioneers and
young knowledge workers.214 Strategies such as these trace their roots to
Richard Florida's influential 2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class.215
Florida argued that, in order to thrive, modern cities must attract "the
creative class. '216 He also posited that cities are benefiting from the en-
ergy provided by creative young professionals, who stay single longer
than in previous generations and who prefer to live in diverse, urban
neighborhoods. 21 7 Cities, according to Florida, "have become the prime
location for the creative lifestyle and the new amenities that go with it. 218
There are, without question, limits to what Joel Kotkin derisively
refers to as the "cool city strategy." '219 To begin, the apparent importance
of collective efficacy to neighborhood health itself suggests that cities
need to prioritize policies encouraging residential stability and home-
ownership (including public safety and education). 220 Moreover, and im-
portantly, even cool people face the life-cycle pressures that favor subur-
ban life. As Kotkin quips, "It turns out that many of the most prized
members of the 'creative class' are not 25-year-old hip cools, but forty-
something adults who, particularly if they have children, end up gravitat-
ing to the suburbs .... -221 Perhaps as a result, the fastest growing cities
tend to be sprawling and located in the fastest-growing regions-the
West and Southwest. Many "[c]ities built for pedestrians and for mass
transit" continue to lose residents, 22 although at a slower rate than in
previous decades.23 As Glaeser and Gottlieb observe, "[T]he [twenty]
years since 1980 have been much better for America's biggest cities than
the [twenty] years before 1980. While this is surely true, it should not
blind us to the fact that the general trend to sun and sprawl has contin-
ued relatively unabated ... ."224 In other words, land-use policies attrac-
tive to the young and hip cannot, standing alone, renew our cities.
Still there is one overriding reason why urban leaders might choose
to emphasize-and to enact land-use policies that enable-"cool" neigh-
214. COOL CITIES INITIATIVE, MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, MICHIGAN'S COOL
CITIES INITIATIVE: A REINVESTMENT STRATEGY 3 (n.d.), http://www.aabds.com/Universityof
Michigan/CoolCityWhitePaper.pdf.
215. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002).
216. Id. at 67-80.
217. Id. at 67-80, 280.
218. Id. at 287.
219. Joel Kotkin, Uncool Cities, PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2005), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
2005/10/uncoolcities/.
220. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 201,208-14 (2010).
221. Kotkin, supra note 219.
222. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, City Growth: Which Places Grew and Why, in 1
REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 200, supra note 2, at 13,
18-19.
223. See Simmons & Lang, supra note 2, at 54-55.
224. Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 1284.
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borhoods with urban land-use patterns: cities are likely better at being
urban than they are at being suburban. Thus, in the Tieboutian competi-
tion between cities and suburbs, city governments must play to their
land-use strengths. While many commentators question central cities'
ability to compete effectively, 25 city governments have long tried to
compete with suburbs for development and investment, especially by
using subsidized financing, tax abatements, infrastructure improvements,
and other incentives to attract investment.26 But these strategies are
likely insufficient on their own. 27  If cities are to compete successfully,
their leaders must recognize the role that local power over land-use poli-
cy-a local government's "most important local regulatory power" ' -
plays in city-suburb competition. 29  To the extent that city neighbor-
hoods have any land-use advantage over suburban ones, it is that some
Americans have a taste for diverse urban environments. That is not to
say that cities find it easy to sell their urban life. But, to borrow from the
economic theory of comparative advantage, cities ought to focus on do-
ing the things they are least bad at doing. And, if Glaeser and Gottlieb
are correct, such a focus provides a comparative-indeed, perhaps a
competitive-edge for cities.
225. The standard account of city-suburb competition provides that local government power over
land use leads inevitably to urban disinvestment. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government
Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1134-35 (1996); Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,349 (1990).
226. See generally Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Recycling and Fed-
eral Enterprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1998); Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick,
Congress Should End the Economic War Among the States, REGION, Mar. 1995 (Special Issue), at 3,
15.
227. Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence suggests that fierce intergovernmental com-
petition renders these strategies-which seek to attract larger employers to a city-ineffective. See,
e.g., GOOD JOBS FIRST, INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, MINDING THE CANDY STORE: STATE
AUDITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 35-41 (2000) (summarizing fifteen state audits that show de-
velopment incentives are generally ineffective); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 390-405
(1996) ("From the states' collective vantage point, the net effect of the incentive competition is, in fact,
far worse than zero-sum. For, although the states can expect to achieve no overall gain in business
activity or jobs, they do incur a very substantial loss of tax revenues."); Franklin J. James, Urban Eco-
nomic Development: A Zero-Sum Game?, in 27 URBAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL REVIEWS: URBAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Richard D. Bingham & John P. Blair eds., 1984) ("There is no
convincing empirical evidence that urban economic development as currently practiced is more than a
zero sum game."); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 795,
810 (1991) ("Another reason for the limited usefulness of economic development incentives is their
ubiquity. Since many jurisdictions offer these benefits they cease to generate an advantage for any
particular locale."). But cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the
Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447,452-78 (1997) (questioning the argument that incentives are
usually a net loss for the offering jurisdiction).
228. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I- The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
229. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconsti-
tutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506-28 (1991) (arguing that local governments
use land-use regulations to compete for residents).
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All of this suggests that, at least when it comes to advancing the im-
portant goal of promoting cities' competitiveness vis-A-vis their suburban
neighbors, the People Paradox works to the advantage of cities. Our
sense of security amidst the vitality of urban life arguably makes city life
more attractive to us than it would be if our intuitive assumptions about
the risk of crowds mapped onto the actual risk of crime. But, unless
land-use regulations enable the development of the mixed-land-use
neighborhoods that generate the vitality that apparently is increasingly
attractive to some Americans, many would-be city dwellers will have lit-
tle reason to reject the relative safety and tranquility of the suburbs.
3. An Unparadoxical Case for Vitality Amidst Urban Poverty
A distinct case can be made for mixed-land-use planning in poor
urban neighborhoods, including many neighborhoods which have not-
and perhaps will never-fully enjoy the benefits of the "urban resur-
gence." Residents of these neighborhoods undoubtedly and intensely
experience the "fear fuelers" describe above on a daily basis-
unavoidable and unacceptable levels of disorder, constant risk of victimi-
zation, and suppressed levels of social capital. These realities lead some
scholars to argue that more-vigilant enforcement of regulations segregat-
ing land uses in poor minority neighborhoods is a moral imperative. For
example, Jon Dubin has asserted, "Residents deprived of zoning protec-
tion are vulnerable to assaults on the safety, quality, and integrity of their
communities ranging from dangerous and environmentally toxic hazards
to more commonplace hazards, such as vile odors, loud noises, blighting
appearances, and traffic congestion. '"230 The answer, according to Dubin,
is to strengthen zoning enforcement in poor neighborhoods and to use
these regulations to suppress the physical disorder that plagues these
communities.231 Similarly, the literature linking commercial land uses to
230. Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in
Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993).
231. See id. at 741-44. Both Dubin and Yale Rabin have suggested that such zoning practices
sometimes are racially motivated. See generally id.; Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable
Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101 (Charles M.
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON: THE
BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM AND BUST 63-70 (1987) (discussing the problems attributable to com-
mercial enterprises in Houston's (unzoned) African American residential neighborhoods); Vicki Been,
Comment on Professor Jerry Frug's The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1113
(1996) [hereinafter Been, Comment] ("Not all land use is bad, and not all zoning is misguided or harm-
ful to the poor and to minorities. Indeed, it is ironic that one of the major forms of expulsive zoning
that poor African American and Hispanic neighborhoods complain about is the mixing of uses-the
very 'improvement' that forms one of the cornerstones of the new urbanism."). There is a substantial
"environmental justice" literature examining whether undesirable land uses are sited in minority
neighborhoods or whether poor and minority families are attracted to those neighborhoods because of
lower property values. On this related "chicken and egg" problem, see Vicki Been, Locally Undesira-
ble Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE
L.J. 1383 (1994); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
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crime and disorder also could be interpreted to suggest that economic ac-
tivity should be minimized in the poorest urban neighborhoods.
The central difficulty with this claim is that the poorest urban
neighborhoods suffer not from too much economic activity but from too
little of it. Thus, before endorsing the necessity of land-use segregation in
poor neighborhoods, urban policy makers must consider whether new
commercial activity in poor neighborhoods will actually be helpful, rath-
er than harmful. There is some limited empirical support for the latter
view. In one of the neighborhood-pair studies discussed above, re-
searchers found that commercial land uses were detrimental in relatively
stable neighborhoods but beneficial in unstable ones . 32 That is, commer-
cial land uses appeared to increase crime and disorder in relatively sta-
ble, middle-class communities and to decrease crime and disorder in rela-
tively poor communities. The researchers had predicted the opposite
effect-that "Jacobs's notion of public land use providing supervisory
'eyes on the street' (and thus leading to lower crime) might be more op-
erative in advantaged, stable neighborhoods. '233 The fact that the data
conflicted with their intuitions led the researchers to reject the assump-
tion that "busy" places generate crime and disorder as "overly simple. ' '23
In other words, there may be no People Paradox in poor neighbor-
hoods. This conclusion is a tentative one, based precariously on intuition
and one study of one hundred neighborhoods in Seattle, Washington.
235
Commercial land uses might work differently-for better or worse-in
other communities. The study provides no hints, moreover, about why
commercial land uses suppressed crime and disorder in poor Seattle
neighborhoods. There are several plausible and overlapping explana-
tions: perhaps in poorer neighborhoods, where social deviants exercise a
greater degree of control of public spaces, shopkeepers and their cus-
tomers do a better job of monitoring crime and disorder. Perhaps legiti-
mate businesses increase the proportion of law-abiding citizens in public
spaces. Perhaps in such communities, commercial land uses fill other-
wise-vacant buildings that would serve as "magnets for crime. "236 It is al-
so possible that commercial land uses in poor communities provide en-
trepreneurial and/or employment opportunities that promote the
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); Thomas Lambert
& Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 195 (1997).
232. Wilcox et al., supra note 49, at 200-02.
233. Id. at 200.
234. Id. at 201.
235. Id. at 191.
236. Vacant buildings are indisputably linked to crime. See, e.g., John Accordino & Gary T.
Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301, 303 (2000)
("[Cirooks, killers, and losers tend to infest areas with dead buildings, like maggots on a carcass."
(quotation omitted)).
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"culture of work" that William Julius Wilson has influentially argued is
critical for the reversal of fortunes of many inner-city communities.237
Whatever the explanation for the divergent effects of commercial
land uses in low-income neighborhoods, the policy implications of data
suggesting that commercial land uses benefit the neighborhoods that
struggle to the greatest extent with crime and disorder are clear: if urban
policy makers wish to reverse the spiral of urban decline in these com-
munities, they must take seriously the call for regulatory reforms encour-
aging a greater mixing of land uses.211
C. The People Paradox and the Land-Use Policing Nexus
Finally, the tension suggested by the People Paradox between dif-
ferent urban policy goals -increasing vitality, decreasing crime and dis-
order, injecting economic life into the poorest urban neighborhoods-
also suggests a connection between land-use and policing policies. I have
explored this connection in greater detail elsewhere, 239 and, rather than
repeating my arguments here, this section instead highlights two intersec-
tions between these two critical areas of urban policy that are implied by
the People Paradox.
1. Unparadoxical People
The first connection flows from the reality of unparadoxical peo-
ple-that is, categories of people who both make us feel safe and make
us safe, as well as categories of people that frighten us and make us less
safe. For example, given the undisputed connection between strong so-
cial ties, collective efficacy, and neighborhood stability, neighborhood
friends fall into the former "good" category.
237. Wilson and others have argued that, as a result of chronic joblessness, inner-city residents
develop what psychologists would term negative self-efficacy. In other words, they wish to achieve
success through work, but they become so discouraged by the reality of their community that they
cease to believe that it is possible to do so. The economic effects of this phenomenon parallel the as-
serted social-influence effects of urban disorder. Just as visible disorder may discourage law abiders
by signaling that a community tolerates lawlessness, widespread unemployment signals that economic
prospects are dim and disheartens job seekers. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 51-86 (1996); see also MIRIAM EREZ & P.
CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, CULTURE, SELF-IDENTITY, AND WORK 99 (1993); Michael H. Schill, Dis-
tressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 507-22 (1993) (discuss-
ing theories explaining why concentrated poverty may lead to a lack of perceived self-efficacy); Marta
Tienda & Haya Stier, Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's Inner City, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 135 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (discussing self-
efficacy theory).
238. For example, Stephen Clowney has proposed that cities deregulate abandoned buildings in
their in rem portfolios and transfer them to inner-city entrepreneurs. Clowney reasons that, given a
choice between abandoned buildings and commercial land uses in their neighborhoods, residents
would opt for the latter. Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black Enterprise with
Land Use Rules, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1095-1103.
239. See generally GARNET-,supra note 1.
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Under certain circumstances, police officers apparently do as well.
There is substantial evidence that certain kinds of policing techniques re-
duce both the fear of crime and crime itself. Importantly, a number of
controlled policing experiments have linked foot patrols with reduced
fear and, in many cases, reduced crime. For example, in 1979, Flint,
Michigan established a neighborhood foot-patrol program, the goals of
which included preventing crime, increasing police-citizen interaction
and catalyzing neighborhood organization."' Over several years, re-
searchers studying the effects of the foot patrols found that, in most of
the beats with foot patrols, crime decreased. 41 Importantly, residents in
these beats believed that foot patrols had decreased crime, regardless of
whether they actually had.242 Residents living in the foot-patrol areas al-
so reported an increased level of communication with one another, a
finding lending further support to the conclusion that order-maintenance
policing efforts can increase neighborhood-level social capital.2 43  Evi-
dence from controlled experiments in other cities also suggests that cer-
tain elements of community policing can reduce the fear of crime and
improve citizen perceptions of police performance.244 In the Citizen Ori-
ented Police Enforcement (COPE) project, for example, Baltimore,
Maryland assigned forty-five officers to newly created units and then var-
ied the intensity and organization of police presence over three years: in
the first, intensive mobile patrol in targeted areas; in the second, officers
increased their contacts with citizens, and some mobile patrols were
shifted to foot patrol; in the third, officers engaged in intensive problem
solving and community mobilization.2 45  The COPE program's aim was
specifically the reduction of the fear of crime. The evidence showed that
fear was reduced most dramatically in the phase of the program featuring
intensive contact and problem solving with community members. 46 It is
reasonable to conclude from these studies that the police represent a par-
tial response to the People Paradox. That is, the police may help address
240. ROBERT TROJANOWICZ, AN EVALUATION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD FOOT PATROL
PROGRAM IN FLINT, MICHIGAN 9 (n.d.).
241. Id. at 27-31.
242. Id. at 31.
243. Id. at 57-63. As discussed above, the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, which served as the
catalyst for the Broken Windows essay, also found that foot patrols reduced the fear of crime, even
when actual crime levels remained stable (or, in some cases, increased). George L. Kelling, Conclu-
sions to POLICE FOUND., supra note 106, at 111, 114-19.
244. See generally David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disor-
der, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42 (2004).
245. Cordner, supra note 199, at 223-25.
246. Id. Other experiments yield similar results: a comprehensive review of empirical and quasi-
empirical studies of the relationship between policing strategies and fear reduction, conducted in 2002,
found that order-maintenance policing strategies reduced fear in thirty-one of fifty studies; eighteen
found no change and one reported an increase in fear. The authors noted that merely increasing
police presence appears to do less to reduce fear than proactive, targeted policing efforts and commu-
nity policing. See Zhao et al., supra note 199, at 280-95 (reviewing literature); see also Renauer, supra
note 199, at 47.
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the negative consequences of land-use reforms that promote greater
land-use diversity in our urban neighborhoods.
The policy prescriptions that flow from this conclusion are, admit-
tedly, not self-evidently clear. Consider the efforts to overcome residents
fear and build collective efficacy that take center stage in many commu-
nity-policing programs. For example, Chicago's CAPS program, dis-
cussed above, incorporates several forms of "assertive vigilance" that
serve this function.247  Police work with local community leaders-
including pastors-organize marches in high-crime areas, prayer vigils at
the site of gang- or drug-related shootings, "smoke-outs" (barbeque pic-
nics) in drug-market areas, and "positive loitering" campaigns to harass
prostitutes and their customers.248 These efforts flow from the hope that
public intervention can reinvigorate collective efficacy when neighbor-
hood self-governance disappears. Yet it remains an open question how
effective these strategies are at their appointed task. Somewhat ironical-
ly, Wilson-who is now seen as the godfather of such efforts-
questioned their efficacy in his 1968 essay, The Urban Unease, when he
argued that "there is relatively little government can do directly to main-
tain a neighborhood community. It can, of course, assign more police of-
ficers to it, but there are real limits to the value of this response. '249 Wil-
son's initial hesitation is at least partially confirmed by evidence
suggesting that police-citizen collaborations that involve citizens directly
in crime-prevention activities may actually increase fear of crime, at least
among participants.2 10
Another complication flows from the evidence linking social incivil-
ities to the fear of crime. This evidence clearly suggests that, as a means
of fear reduction, order-maintenance proponents are correct to empha-
size policing policies that focus on curbing social incivilities 5t That said,
recognizing this reality and responding to it appropriately are different
things. Undoubtedly, just as there are categories of people who tend to
both make us safer and make us feel safer, other categories of people
likely both frighten us and increase our risk of victimization. U.S. law,
however, strongly disfavors singling out categories of people (as opposed
to categories of behaviors) for disfavored treatment. Yet the line be-
tween targeting the social incivilities that frighten us and the people as-
sociated with those incivilities is blurry,252 leading order-maintenance crit-
247. COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 110, at 91-92; see also infra Part IVA.
248. COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 110, at 91-92; see also Tracey L. Meares &
Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1315, 1333-35 (2007)
(discussing prayer vigils).
249. James Q. Wilson, The Urban Unease: Community vs. City, 12 PUB. INT. 25,34(1968).
250. See supra note 199.
251. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996).
252. For example, several California cities have public nuisance laws to enjoin gang members
from engaging in certain conduct-a practice condoned by the courts but condemned as profiling by
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ics to argue that an excessive focus on disorder can lead to racial profil-
ing, police abuse of discretion, and the inhumane treatment of marginal-
ized groups such as the homeless. 253 The debate over the Chicago ordi-
nance criminalizing gang loitering that the Supreme Court invalidated in
City of Chicago v. Morales254 illustrates that this debate has both norma-
tive and constitutional implications. While the dissent emphasized the
fear generated by gang members loitering in public places, a plurality of
the Court expressed concern about racial profiling resulting from the dis-
cretion vested in police by the law.215 Further complicating the question
is evidence suggesting that, while policing tactics that successfully reduce
the fear of crime improve public satisfaction with the police, citizens who
fear the police-that is, who are afraid that police will abuse their author-
ity-also express high levels of fear of crime.2 16 This evidence is at least
suggestive of the fact that some aggressive policing tactics may backfire
and generate more fear."7 Moreover, there is evidence that overpolicing
may counterproductively erode the stigma of punishment, especially in
poor communities. 258
2. Unparadoxical Disorder
The People Paradox also highlights a final, uncomplicated connec-
tion between land-use and policing policies. People are not paradoxical
simply because they sometimes make us feel safe while increasing the
risk of victimization; people are also paradoxical because they generate
the disorder that frightens us. Increased physical disorder results from
increased land-use intensity because the people drawn into public spaces
by commercial land uses usually leave a footprint. Fortunately, in con-
trast to the complexities of effectively responding to unparadoxical peo-
ple, the effective response to the physical disorder generated by com-
mercial land uses is decidedly uncomplex: when people leave a disorderly
critics. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 608, 615 (Cal. 1997) (upholding an injunction
prohibiting members of the "Vario Sureo Town" (VST) gang from "[sItanding, sitting, walking, driv-
ing, gathering, or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant.., or with any other
known 'VST'... member" (alteration in original)); see also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reef-
er Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989-
2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 165 (2007); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitu-
tion: A Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 717 (2000); Stephanie Smith, Comment, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing
Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000); Gary Stewart, Note, Black
Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107
YALE L.J. 2249 (1998).
253. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
254. 527 U.S. 41 (1998).
255. Id. at 60-64; id. at 114-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
256. See Renauer, supra note 199, at 46.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008).
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footprint, erase it. In other words, cities should pick up the trash. It is
not just unsightly; it scares us. This simple reality strongly suggests that
attention to basic city services, including sanitation and infrastructure, is
an imperative. It also may recommend efforts of many cities, through
"311" hotlines and otherwise, to collect information about, and respond
more quickly and effectively to, quality-of-life problems. It also suggests
the wisdom of coupling land-use reforms emphasizing urban vitality with
sublocal government institutions, such as business-improvement districts,
which tend to focus on providing supplemental sanitation and security
services in urban communities. 259
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to build a case for land-use policies enabling
and encouraging mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods that comes to
terms with frequently unacknowledged evidence linking commercial land
uses with crime and disorder. This case is built around an apparent par-
adox-city busyness may simultaneously make us feel safer while in-
creasing our vulnerability to crime. This "People Paradox" suggests that
two important (and related) urban policy goals-city-suburb competi-
tiveness and crime reduction-are sometimes in tension with one anoth-
er. It also suggests a greater understanding of the connection between
land-use and policing policies may be necessary to advance these goals.
259. Business improvement districts are territorial-defined sublocal districts in a city which fi-
nances, primarily through special assessments on real property, the supplemental provision of local
services. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 503, 512-14, 517-21 (1997). On business improvement district functions, see generally Richard
Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 365,394-408 (1999). On the functions of tax increment financing, see generally Rich-
ard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local
Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 65,67-74 (2010).
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